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APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
The Appellant, Robert Mulder (hereinafter referred to as "Robert")
improperly attempts to appeal the Finding of Contempt and Order, entered
December 21, 2006 ("the Contempt Order"). A copy of the Contempt Order
is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 1. Because the Contempt Order was
conditional with an opportunity to be purged, Robert was guilty of "civil
contempt" which is non-appealable. See Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d
1162 (Utah 1988), absent certification from the lower court pursuant to Utah
R. Civ. P. 54(b) or grant of a petition to appeal under Utah R. App. P. 5,
neither of which occurred in this case. Accordingly, this court is without
jurisdiction.
In the event that this court rules the Contempt Order is appealable,
then this court would have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(h) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.1

In the further event that this Court deems an appeal properly taken, then the
Appellant's brief should be rejected for violation of Utah R. App. P. 24(k).
In any event, no oral argument is required under Utah R. App. P. 29(a)
because the appeal is frivolous or the facts and legal arguments are
adequately presented and the decisional process would not be significantly
aided by oral argument.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Robert attempts to visit upon this court, the chaos he has attempted to
create in the lower court in this divorce proceeding from his former wife,
Tamara Caputo, f/k/a Tamara Mulder (hereinafter referred to as "Tamara").
In his opening brief, Robert raises every perceived grievance throughout the
entire course of these divorce proceedings. Robert is not appealing, however,
from a final decision of the lower court in which all properly preserved
errors could be presented. Instead, this appeal must be limited to the specific
issues relating to the Contempt Order itself.
Thus, the only issues properly considered herein are the following:
1. Whether the lower court properly found Robert in civil contempt
(a) for failing to pay child support and attorney's fees and costs previously
imposed as sanctions against his prior violations of the court's orders; and
(b) for clearly violating the lower court's order to cease filing improper
motions and other documents which continued to reiterate arguments
rejected by the lower court. The lower court's factual findings of Mulder's
contempt are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Von Hake v.
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). The sentence for such contempt

2

is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Clark, 2005 UT
75, p 7 ; Thurgoodv. Uzelac, 2003 UT App 439, f7.
2. Whether this court has jurisdiction of the appeal of the Contempt
Order, which was only for civil contempt which is not a final, appealable
order and from which Robert failed to petition this court for the grant of an
interlocutory appeal. The determination of this court's jurisdiction is a
question of law which must be decided by this court. See Miller v. USAA
Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, at ^18; Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App. 290
at \ 14; Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah App. 1992);
3. If this court does exercise jurisdiction over the appeal of the lower
court's interlocutory order of civil contempt, whether this court can consider
other issues which were not properly preserved because there was no appeal
as of right taken from the final Divorce Decree; no petitions for the grant of
interlocutory appeals from any interlocutory decisions denying Robert's
other motions; and the filing of his Notice of Appeal herein deprived the
lower court of jurisdiction prior to the hearing of Robert's Rule 60(b)(4)
motion. Questions of whether issues were properly preserved below are
questions of law for this court's determination.
4. Whether the lower court properly exercised subject matter

3

jurisdiction in this matter when Tamara's only legal residence was in Utah
County and had been for a substantial period prior to the filing of the
complaint herein. Factual findings made by the lower court will be upheld
unless they are clearly erroneous. Legal conclusions are reviewed for
correction of error. Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573 (Utah App. 1993).
5. Whether the improper attempts to "remove" this case (a) to the
Pembina Group's so-called "Federal Circuit Court" which has been
previously determined to be a legal nullity or (b) to remove to the Utah
federal court when such removal was clearly untimely (well-beyond the 30
day time period allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
deprived the lower court of subject matter jurisdiction. Factual findings
made by the lower court will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.
Legal conclusions are reviewed for correction of error. Mostrong v. Jackson,
866 P.2d 573 (Utah App. 1993).
5. Whether Robert, who had substantial ties to Utah County, was
subject to personal jurisdiction of the Fourth District Court when he was
served with a summons and a copy of the Complaint, when he stipulated that
the Fourth District Court had personal jurisdiction over him, and when he
sought affirmative relief from that court. Factual findings made by the lower
court will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Legal conclusions are

4

reviewed for correction of error. Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573 (Utah
App. 1993).
6. Whether Robert's due process rights have been violated by the
lower court (a) insisting that Robert comply with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; (b) refusing to repeatedly re-consider Robert's jurisdictional and
due process arguments; (c) declining to respond to Robert's alleged Freedom
of Information Act ("FOIA") requests or (d) refusing to be examined by
Robert in open court. The lower court's factual findings of Mulder's
contempt are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Von Hake v.
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). Constitutional questions,
including that of due process, are questions of law which are reviewed for
correctness. In re KM,

965 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The

conduct of the lower court's proceedings is reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, ^{37; Thurgood v. Uzelac,
2003 UT App 439, %7.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL
There are various Constitutional provisions that have a bearing on the
outcome of this appeal, but contrary to Robert's contentions, none of which
are dispositive.
The following Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah statutes
5

are dispositive: (1) Utah R. App. P. 3 regarding appeals from final orders;
(2) Utah R. App. P. 4 regarding the 30 day time period for appeals from final
orders and judgments; (3) Utah R. App. P. 5 regarding the filing of petitions
for permission to appeal from interlocutory orders and to do so within 20
days; (4) Utah Code Ann. §78-32-1 regarding the acts constituting
contempts of the court; and (5) Utah Code Ann. §78-32-3 regarding the
procedure for the finding of contempt within the presence of the court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case between the Defendant/Appellant Robert
Mulder (hereinafter referred to as "Robert") and the Plaintiff/Appellee,
Tamara Caputo, fk/a Tamara Mulder (hereinafter referred to as "Tamara").
The divorce decree was entered pursuant to a stipulation of the parties on
December 7, 2005 by the Hon. Gary D. Stott. Since that time, Robert has
made virtually every conceivable, and frankly inconceivable, argument to
avoid complying with the orders of the court.
In the process, Robert has filed numerous improper motions and
documents, has issued his own orders including one to Judge Stott to recuse
himself, and generally claims that he is "a sovereign being" not subject to
the statutory laws of this state. He has attempted to make a mockery of the

6

legal proceedings. Those actions resulted in Judge Stott twice ordering
sanctions against Robert.
Presently before this court is the appeal of Judge Stott5 s December 21,
2006 order wherein he found Robert liable for civil contempt ("the
Contempt Order") issued after Robert clearly violated Judge Stott5 s order of
October 2, 2006 ("the October 2 Order55) (copy attached as Exhibit 2 to the
Appenix). Robert, however, attempts to make it much more—an all out
attack upon the law, Judge Stott, the Utah courts, and this country's form of
government. While engaging in this misguided effort, Robert continues to
harm his family. To date, he has avoided paying child support and courtordered attorney's fees and costs collectively in excess of $13,000.
B. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On or about September 7, 2005, Tamara filed her Complaint for
Divorce. (R. 5). Robert was served with the Summons and Complaint on
September 13, 2005. (See R. 13).
Rather than responding to the Complaint on its merits, Robert filed a
"Notice of Removal55 (R. 8) to the fictitious "Federal Circuit Court of the
Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America.55 Robert claimed that
he was a member of the "Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North
America55 ("hereinafter

referred to as "the Pembina Group55); and

7

concurrently lodged several documents wherein he was purportedly
"appointed" as a judge of "the Federal Circuit Court" and wherein he then
promptly issued his own divorce and signed it as "Judge Robert Mulder."
(SeeR. 12).
Mulder failed to file a timely answer or a motion to dismiss as
required by Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, on
October 21, 2005, Tamara moved for entry of a default divorce decree. (R.
121). In her Affidavit in Support of Motion for Entry of Default Judgment
(R. 109), Tamara invoked the jurisdiction of the lower court by asserting that
she had been a resident of Utah County, Utah for at least 90 days prior to the
filing of the Complaint; that her last permanent residence prior to the filing
of the Complaint had been in Orem, Utah for a period of nine months, and
prior to that she had been a resident of Mapleton, Utah (also part of Utah
County). (R. I09at1j2.)
Tamara's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Default
Judgment (R. 102), the Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry
of Default Divorce and Entry of Protective Order (R. 255), and the exhibits
to those two memoranda conclusively established that Robert's attempt to
"remove" this case to the Pembina Group's "Federal Circuit Court" was

8

improper and that Robert was entitled to no special rights, immunities, or
exemptions from state or federal law. It was shown that:
1. Mulder's Pembina Group is a mere group of individuals claiming
an attenuated affiliation with an Indian tribe, but with at least four different
factions claiming the right to lead the "tribe." See R. 102 and Exhibits 1-3)
and R. 255 at Exhibit 12).
2. Among many interesting claims, the Pembina Group contends that
it is the rightful owner of at least 62 million acres of land in North Dakota,
South Dakota, Missouri, and Montana. The Pembina Group further claims
that the United States government owes the Pembina Group over one trillion
dollars. See e.g. R. 102 at page 2 of Ex. 3.
3. Neither the Pembina Group as a whole, nor any faction thereof, is a
"federally recognized tribe" as shown by its conspicuous absence from the
list of federally-recognized tribes in the United States Federal Register. See
R. 102 at Ex. 4.
4. The Pembina Group claims the right "to appoint whomever they
choose to belong to their group—without concern for race or blood line."
See R. 102 at Ex. 2. This further confirms that it is not an Indian tribe within
the meaning of United States law which requires a genetic/genealogical
basis for recognized tribe membership.

9

5. The Pembina Group is not recognized as an Indian tribe, but it is
recognized as an anti-government extremist group claiming immunity from
United States and state law. See R. 102 at Ex. 5.
6. An Oregon federal court has recognized that the Pembina Group's
court is not valid and that "any judgment of the Little Shell Pembina Band is
legally meaningless." See R. 102 at Ex. 6.
7. Similarly, on March 2, 2005, the Hon. Dale A. Kimball, District
Judge for the United States District Court for the District of Utah
specifically ruled against Robert in Robert's improper attempt to remove
another matter from state court to the federal court based upon his affiliation
with the Pembina Group. In his ruling, Judge Kimball stated: "[The
'Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America' is not a federally
recognized tribe and thus its 'tribal court' cannot exercise jurisdiction over
the Mulders." (R. 255 at note 2 and page 4 of Exhibit 15 thereto).
8. On or about October 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed Judge Kimball's ruling that Robert's alleged "fundamental,
God-given and Constitutionally supported Rights as 'Sovereign citizens' of
the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America" had not been
violated by Utah's non-judicial foreclosure of property (in response to the
foreclosure, Robert had attempted to transfer title to the subject property to

10

the Pembina Group by quitclaim deed). The Court of Appeals also held that
the purported removal of the case to the Pembina Group court was a nullity
because a the Bureau of Indian Affairs does not recognize this tribe or its
courts." (R. 255 at note 2 and Exhibit 16 thereto at pp. 2, 5)(emphasis
added).
In response to the Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, on October
28 and October 31, 2005, Robert filed his "Motion to Quash Petitioner's
Motion for Entry of Default Divorce Decree and Entry of Protective Order,
Memorandum in Support of Said Motion, Petitioner's Perjurious Affidavit,
and Petitioner's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law." (R. 124 and R.
138). Concurrently, Robert also filed a "Rebuttal to Affidavit of Tamara
Mulder in Support of Motion for Entry of Default Judgment" (R. 153) which
contains a long list of allegations purporting to contradict those in Tamara's
supporting affidavit, but which is damning in three respects:
a.

Robert clearly establishes general Utah jurisdiction over

himself by admitting his longtime ownership of various properties in
Utah County (See id. at ^[13)(including the houses in Orem, Utah and
Mapleton, Utah in which Tamara lived and upon which she based her
claim of legal residency);

11

b.

Tamara never established any new permanent, legal residency

outside of Utah while she was trying to escape from Robert (Id. at ^|2);
and
c.

Although Robert may claim Indian heritage, i.e. being "3/16*

Choctaw and 1/16

Cherokee," he is not a lineal descendent or

legitimate member of any tribe known as the "Pembina Nation Little
Shell Band of North America/5 but instead is an alleged "naturalized"
member of the Pembina Group (id. at ^f 6).
Pursuant to notice dated November 4, 2005 (R. 174), a hearing was
scheduled to take place on December 1, 2005 for argument on all pending
motions (i.e. Tamara's motion for entry of default judgment and Robert's
motion to quash, which liberally construed could have been viewed as a
Rule 12(b)(1) and/or (2) motion to dismiss). Apparently unwilling to present
his case to the lower court, Robert then attempted to remove the case to the
United States District Court for the District of Utah on the grounds that his
"treaty" rights were being violated in this action. (See R. 178). As shown
above, Robert attempted to do so with the full knowledge that the Utah
federal district court and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
previously had ruled that the Pembina Group had no recognized legal status,

12

and thus any attempted removal to the Utah federal district court on the basis
9

of the Pembinga Group's alleged treaty rights was improper.
On December 1, 2005, Judge Stott conducted the scheduled hearing.
Prior to the hearing, Robert retained Mr. Greg Christiansen as his counsel,
who entered his appearance on Mulder's behalf. {See R.276). At the
hearing, the Motion for Entry of Default Judgment was granted, and the
court authorized Tamara's counsel to submit findings of facts and
conclusions of law and a divorce decree consistent with the Complaint.
In an effort to obtain protection from Robert, Tamara had obtained an
ex parte protective order against Robert. The date scheduled for the hearing
to determine whether to make the temporary restraining order permanent
was scheduled for December 7, 2005. {See R. 396 at 1fl[6-7, see also> R.337
2

On January 4, 2006, Judge Ted Stewart of the Utah federal court dismissed
Robert's attempted removal on the grounds that the attempted removal was
untimely and the federal court lacked jurisdiction to decide divorce cases.
See Memorandum Decision and Order Dismissing Case, copy attached to
Addendum as Ex. 3.
3
In his opening brief, Robert claims that he was "surprised" that Judge Stott
had not respected the Notice of Removal to the federal court and so he had
to hire Mr. Christiansen on an "emergency basis." These contentions are
false. The Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (R. 302) specifically
noted that the lower court had advised Mr. Mulder the week prior to the
December 1st hearing that the hearing was going forward. Further, Mr.
Mulder continued to use Mr. Christiansen's services for over three months,
until Mr. Christiansen withdrew after Mr. Mulder, on his own and not
through his counsel, caused subpoenas to be improperly issued to a number
of witnesses. See Order Granting Motion for Protective Order (R. 455)
13

at f 13) Tamara and the parties' two oldest sons were prepared to testify
against Robert and in support of obtaining a permanent restraining order
against him. See R. 396 at fflj6-7
Prior to the scheduled December 7th hearing and while Robert was
represented by Mr. Christiansen, the parties entered into a Stipulation (R.
297)("the Stipulation55) agreeing to the entry of the Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law (R. 302)("the Findings and Conclusions55), a Decree of
Divorce (R. 305)("the Decree55), and most importantly, an Order and
Addendum to Divorce Decree (R. 293)("the Addendum55). The Stipulation,
Findings and Conclusions, Decree, and the Addendum are attached to the
addendum as Exhibits 4, 5, 6, and 7 respectively.
In the Stipulation and the Addendum, Tamara made significant
concessions from the relief that Judge Stott had granted her on December 1,
2005 in exchange for certainty that her divorce from Robert would be final,
and Robert obtained significant benefits. More particularly, the Stipulation
and the Addendum had several important provisions modifying the terms of
the Decree. Among other things,
a.

The Stipulation provided that Robert agreed that the Findings

and Conclusions should be entered immediately and that he would not

14

dispute them nor would he file any motion to set them aside. (R. 297

am).4
b.

Tamara agreed to allow the Ex Parte Protective Order in Civil

No. 054402186 to expire and to not seek a renewal thereof. (Id. at P ) .
c.

Tamara and Robert agreed to new protective provisions limiting

contact from Mulder or from a woman traveling with Mulder who
claimed to be Mulder's "common law wife." (Id. at 1fl[4-6).
d.

Rather than not allowing Robert to have parent time with the

parties' children until a psychological evaluation had been conducted
(as originally requested in the Complaint and the original Decree), it
was agreed that Robert could have supervised visits with the children
with Robert's parents acting as supervisors. Robert's parent time was
to commence no sooner than January 2006 for one week periods
provided Robert gave 30 days advance written notice. Robert also
would have four consecutive weeks of parent time during the summer

4

Given Robert's repeated, but completely unsuccessful history of trying to
use his membership in the Pembina Group as a means to delay and avoid
legal proceedings and consequences, one of the most important provision of
the Stipulation was his agreement to the entry of the Findings and
Conclusions which, among other things, provided that the lower court had
jurisdiction. See id., Finding No. 1 and Conclusion No. 1, that the Pembina
Group was not a federally-recognized tribe or a treaty tribe, and that Robert
could not rely upon any claimed membership or any documents issued by
the Pembina Group See id. at Finding Nos. 15 and 18, Conclusion No. 4.
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upon 45 days advance notice. Finally, in the event that the parent time
visits went without adverse incident in 2006, Robert would then have
standard parent time provisions provided in Utah Code Ann §§30-333, 30-3-35, and 30-3-36. See id. atffif7-8.
In reliance upon the Stipulation, the Findings and Conclusions, the
Decree, and the Addendum, Tamara married Mr. Michael Caputo on
December 9, 2005, two days after the filing of the Decree and Addendum.
(R. 396atTfl2)
Robert's promise to not challenge the jurisdiction of the court or to
rely upon his membership in the Pembina Group as a basis to avoid the
application of Utah law was short-lived. On or about February 6, 2006,
Robert filed his Motion and Memorandum to Set Aside Stipulation. (R.
331). Therein, Robert, through his counsel Mr. Christiansen, argued that the
entire Stipulation should be set aside for only two reasons: (1) that Tamara
allegedly had failed to provide contact information for the parties' children
as required by paragraph 9 of the Stipulation; and (2) that Tamara had
moved from the State of Utah without giving at least sixty (60) days advance
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notice.5 Robert never scheduled a hearing on his motion to set aside the
Stipulation.6
In the first week of April 2006, Robert's counsel withdrew (R. 447
and R. 455). This was done after Robert, not his counsel, caused a number of
subpoenas to be issued in violation of the Decree which ordered no
discovery without a pretrial conference first.
Rather than retaining new counsel, Robert returned to representing
himself and began inundating the court with a series of improper motions
and documents including the following:
a. A "Lodgment55 of a Statement of Facts/Notice of Recission of
Contracts (R. 402);7

5

Robert now contends in his appeal, that he also should not be bound by the
Stipulation because Tamara fraudulently induced him to sign the Stipulation
by promising that Robert would be able to see the parties5 children after
signing the Stipulation and other documents. That assertion is directly
contradicted by the express terms of the Stipulation which provided that
Mulder would have parent time commencing in January 2006, not
December. See R. 297 at ^f7c. It is further directly contradicted by his own
affidavit wherein he specifically admitted that Tamara told him that he
would not be able to see the children prior to December 7, 2005. Indeed, it
was precisely because of that, Robert and his father purchased gift
certificates and other items which he left with his counsel. See R. 337 at
W8-21.
6
These contentions were ultimately rejected by the lower court. See R. 679

at m 7-9.
7

Among other things, in this document, Robert challenged the Stipulation on
a new theory, i.e. that it was unconscionable and signed under threat and
duress that he would not see his children for at least six months if he did not
17

b. A "Notice of Non-appearance and Request for Information re:
FOIA, Fifth Amendment" (R. 465).8
c. A "Lodgment" of an "Affidavit of Revocation and Asservation and
Declaration of Status" (R. 476).9

sign it. He also asserted that he did not submit himself to the jurisdiction of
the Utah court; that he is not a "Statutory Citizen" of the State of Utah; and
that he is a "living, breathing flesh and blood Native American man, and
stands under the treaties of 1778 and 1863. As such, [Robert] is subject to
Natural Justice as outlined in the terms of the 1778 treaty...." (R. 402 at
page 3 of the Statement).
In this document, Robert engaged in a rambling dissertation, and he
refused to "appear" in the case until Judge Stott answered 26 written
questions.
9
Therein, Robert unilaterally declared that he was revoking his signature on
the Stipulation, that the Stipulation was no longer of any force and effect and
no longer existed. In the attached "Asservation and Declaration of Status,"
Robert again reveals his misguided belief that he is not subject to the rules
and laws of the State of Utah or the authority of the Utah courts. Among
other things, Robert states in his Asservation: That he is natural born free,
sui juris, de jure New York citizen; that jurisdiction is "My Sovereign
Domain;" That "[r]ecent studies have convinced me that US Governments
have, by shrewd legal entrapment, deception, color of and law and
Constructive Fraud, deceived Citizens into waiving rights and privileges
granted them by God and affirmed by the organic documents knows as the
Constitution, and placed them under de facto or foreign JURISDICTIONAL
AUTHORITY, in order to place them in a position of voluntary and
involuntary peonage and enslavement...;" that "I am Sovereign... over the
instruments of our creation, namely our limited governments.... The
governments ... exercise power by tyrannical military police power (martial
law rule), using unauthorized War Powers and perpetrating mixed war with
color of authority, in total defiance of our unalienable, God given rights;"
that if anyone does not dispute his statements that he is sovereign and not
subject to the laws of the various states, or does not provide evidence to the
contrary, then "the foregoing truth will be assumed by default, and your
18

d. A "Request for Information Second Notice Re: FOIA, First and
Fifth Amendments." (R. 485).10
e. A "Notice of Default Three Day Notice to Cure.55 (R. 489).11
f. A "Notice of Default to Petitioner Three Day Notice to Cure.55 (R.
504).12
g. A "Final Default55 against the Petitioner. (R. 506).13
In response to these spurious filings, none of which were motions
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Tamara was forced to move to
strike the foregoing filings and to seek sanctions against Robert. (R. 511 and
521).14

silence acquiescence that the affirmations of this document are true, as
affirmed by this Citizen.55 Id at pp 1-2 of the Asservation
10
Robert again demanded that Judge Stott answer his 26 written questions.
11
Here, Robert found that Judge Stott "is in default [i.e. by failing to respond
to the two "FOIA requests55 described above] and is given three days to cure,
and if not cured within such time, a final default upon this case will be
entered by the clerk of the court according to the rules of the court.55
12
Robert claimed that Tamara5 s alleged failure to respond to his affidavits
(when there was no obligation to do so since no motion was properly filed
requiring a response), and that the failure to so respond within three days
would cause "the facts contained therein [to] be admitted into the records of
this court as evidence, according to your own rules of evidence.55'
13
In this document, Robert concluded that "The Petitioner's failure to rebut
Aggrieved5s [i.e. Robert's] Affidavits on a point by point basis equates to
stipulation of all facts stated therein, and accedes to the frauds that Petitioner
and her counsel have committed upon the court and upon Aggrieved.55
After the filing of the Motion to Strike, Mulder continued to inundate the
lower court with improper documents, including the "Motion to Claim and
Exercise Constitutional Rights and Require the Presiding Judge to Rule
19

On August 1, 2006, Judge Stott gave notice of a hearing to be
conducted on September 11, 2006 for oral argument to take place on most of
the outstanding motions. (R. 602). On August 14, 2006; however, Tamara's
Motion to Strike Mulder's filings was granted, and the September 11, 2006
hearing was cancelled. (R. 615). Tamara's counsel was to prepare the
appropriate order.
Robert then moved to set aside Judge Stott's August 14, 2006 ruling
(R. 617). On August 30, 2006, Judge Stott denied Robert's Motion to Set
Aside (R. 631) in part ruling that Robert "has failed to direct the court to any
specific relief or provide the court with any statutory basis for relief. The
court will not ferret out arguments that [Robert] has made to attempt to fit
within the proper procedural framework." Id.
In a direct challenge to Judge Stott, Robert immediately then filed a
"Motion to Reconsider Ruling dated 8/30/06 and Order dated 8/14/06" (R.
656), and a "Motion to Reconsider Order Striking Defendant's Filings;
Imposing Sanctions, and Authorizing Interim Judgment Pursuant to your

Upon This Motion, and All Public Officers of this Court to Uphold Said
Rights" (R. 582); the "Motion to Demand this Court Read All Pleadings
Respondent/Aggrieved Files with this Court, and Adhere Only to
Constitutionally Compliant Law and Case Law, and more particularly, the
Bill of Rights, in All Rulings" (R. 580); the "Jurisdictional Challenge" (R.
563; the "Judicial Notice" (R. 599); and a "Request for Hearing on
Jurisdictional Challenge and Constitutional Compliance Issues." (R. 604).
20

Rule 60(b)55 (R. 656) wherein Robert incorrectly believed that the order
resulting from the August 14, 2006 hearing had been entered, and again
repeating all the same arguments previously rejected by Judge Stott.
On or about October 2, 2006, Judge Stott actually entered his Order
Striking Defendant's Filings; Imposing Sanctions, Authorizing Interim
Judgment and Denying Other Motions (R. 679) (which had been delayed so
that Judge Stott also could deal with the two most recent "motions for
reconsideration5' filed by Robert).
The October 2 Order included the legal and factual bases for the lower
court's rulings, including its exercise of jurisdiction. Judge Stott also ordered
that (a) any further documents filed challenging the jurisdiction of the court
would be deemed contempt and may subject [Robert] to further sanctions;
(b) Robert's filings were contrary to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (c)
Robert had not been denied any Constitutional or due process rights; (d) any
further contention by Robert that his due process rights had been violated
would be deemed contempt of court that may subject him to further
sanctions; (e) there were no grounds for nullifying the Stipulation, Findings
and Conclusions, Decree, and Addendum; and (f) sanctions against Robert
were proper based upon prior rulings of the court and Robert's continuous
filing of improper documents.
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Within eight days of its filing, Robert violated the October 2 Order by
filing his "Notice of Objections and Motion for More Definitive Statement"
(R. 694). Further, on October 25, 2006, Mulder filed his "Notice of Motion
for Void Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) and Demand for Trial by Jury"
and supporting memorandum (R. 743). Interestingly, this latter motion
constituted one and perhaps the only authorized motion challenging the
lower court's jurisdiction, but improperly claiming denial of Robert's
Constitutional rights, and improperly demanding a jury trial.15
Based upon the foregoing, and exasperated by Robert's blatant
attempts to run up the costs of the litigation and to defy the court's orders,
Tamara filed her Ex Parte Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendant
Should Not Be Held in Contempt for Failing to Comply With the Orders of
this Court (R. 747). Robert was served with a copy of this motion. See
Certificate of Service thereto.
In her motion for order to show cause, three violations of the lower
court's prior orders were asserted: (1) Robert's failure to pay child support

15

By acknowledging that the Robert's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was
"authorized," Tamara does not agree that it has merit. If and when heard by
the lower court, she will argue, among other things, that the motion is
untimely, that the law of the case precludes re-hearing Robert's arguments,
and that the lower court has subject matter jurisdiction for the reasons stated
in the October 2 Order.
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of $1,450 per month as provided in the Stipulation and Decree (there was a
deficit of over $9,500 as of October 2, 2006 (R. 679 at ft3); Robert's failure
to pay attorney's fees and costs awarded to Tamara and/or her counsel for
previous sanctions awarded against Robert; and (3) violation of the Order by
continuing to re-raise arguments which had been rejected by Judge Stott.
The Order to Show Cause Why Defendant Should Not Be Held in
Contempt of Court for Failing to Comply with the Orders of this Court was
issued and set for hearing on December 1, 2006 (copy attached to the
Appendix at Exhibit 8).
Apparently acting as a "sovereign," Robert then filed his own order
with the lower court purporting to remove Judge Stott from this case by
filing a "Notice of Recusal for Cause" (R. 758). Therein, Robert accused
Judge Stott of "bias, prejudice, and racial discrimination, including acts of
racial profiling, against Respondent." (Id.)
Robert was not served with an actual copy of the Order to Show
Cause (as he has proven extremely difficult to serve), but he nevertheless
appeared at the hearing. See Minutes of Supplemental Order (R. 766). There
were no other motions scheduled to be heard. At the hearing, Robert made
no arguments regarding the merits of the Order to Show Cause. Instead, he
improperly attempted to engage Judge Stott in an exchange of questions and
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answers, which Judge Stott properly refused to do. After exercising patience
with Robert, Judge Stott finally found Robert guilty of contempt and ordered
him to be jailed for 15 days or to pay the back due child support through
November 2006 and to pay Tamara's counsel5s fees awarded as part of the
sanctions against Robert all within 30 days. A hearing was then set for
January 8, 2007 to see whether Robert complied with the court's order. Id.
Apparently anticipating the results, Robert immediately filed his
Notice of Appeal (R. 768) (copy attached as Exhibit 9 to the addendum) on
December 1, 2006,16 even though the Contempt Order was not filed until
December 21, 2006. This precluded the court from hearing Robert's Rule
60(b)(4) contentions.
On January 8, 2007; the hearing scheduled to determine Robert's
compliance with the Order was cancelled because Robert filed a lawsuit
against Judge Stott (and others) which forced Judge Stott to recuse himself.
See Minutes of Hearing and Recusal Order attached to the addendum as
Exhibits 10 and 11.

16

It is interesting that Robert now claims that he was unaware of the
contempt proceeding as he was fully prepared to engage Judge Stott in a
legal question and answer session, and he had his Notice of Appeal ready for
filing.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Robert's Notice of Appeal indicates that it is an appeal of all orders
entered at the hearing on December 1, 2006. The Contempt Order was the
only order entered as a result of that hearing.
Judge Stott properly found Robert liable for civil contempt. As is
clearly demonstrated by the above-referenced history of the case, there are
ample grounds for Judge Stott ruling that Robert had knowingly violated the
October 2 Order. Indeed, Mulder does not deny that he violated that order.
There was no abuse of discretion by Judge Stott in finding Robert for
contempt.
Because the Contempt Order provided an opportunity for Robert to
purge the contempt, it was an order of civil contempt. As such, this appeal
should be dismissed because civil contempt orders are not appealable as of
right. If Robert wished to appeal this interlocutory matter, he was obligated
to do so by petitioning this court for an interlocutory appeal under Rule 5(a)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. He did not. Accordingly, this
court lacks jurisdiction, and Robert's appeal should be dismissed.
None of the issues presented in Robert's opening brief were properly
preserved before the lower court in connection with the Contempt Order. No
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responsive memorandum was filed to the motion for order to show cause
why Robert should not be held in contempt. Further, at the hearing itself,
Robert chose to question and argue with Judge Stott rather than present any
actual factual or legal arguments. Thus, he failed to preserve his issues on
appeal.
Robert's Appellate Brief lists many documents in which various
jurisdictional and due process contentions were made, but only three rulings
were made by the lower court. The first of these was the Decree and the
Addendum, from which no appeal as of right was taken. The second was the
ruling on August 30, 2006, wherein Judge Stott denied Robert's Motion to
Set Aside (R. 631) and from which no interlocutoy appeal was sought. The
third was the October 2 Order wherein Judge Stott provided a detailed basis
for his decisions. Robert failed to file any appeal as of right (which there was
none) and failed to file a petition to this court for an interlocutory review
within twenty days of the October 2 Order as required by Appellate Rule
5(a).
Robert's Motion for Void Judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) also did not
preserve any issue for the current appeal. Robert filed his Notice of Appeal
of the court's December 1, 2006 oral ruling and the Contempt Order before
the lower court was allowed to rule on Robert's Rule 60(b)(4) motion.
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Accordingly, Robert's arguments before this court are premature and should
be dismissed because the lower court never considered that motion,
Substantively, Kobert's appeal is without mem. i c Vwer court nas
subject matter jurisdiction o\ ei th is matter a s this is a di\ 01 ce proceeding

requisite period of time necessary to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Robert
cannot avoid that jurisdiction by claiming membership !n the Pembina
Group, which h not a federally-recognized tribe and is not a treaty tribe.
Indeed, even ii Kooert was an American Indian, ^ \ vould still be subject to
[ J t a h l a w.

' '

•'

'

•.

.

Subject matter jurisdiction also was not lost ilnv ^u

Robert's

procedural machinations of trying to "remove" this case iu the Pembina
Group's fictitious "coiirt;" nor his clearly untimely and improper attempted
removal to the Utah federal court. I Ins ;s cspa. u»n >• rue suk:c Uiat court and

legal m.atters to the Pembina Group, nor could he rely upon h is membership
to avoid legal consequences by resorting to the federal courts.
The lower court also obtained person al jurisdiction over Robert as he
was properly served v,,-h process, \^ u „ >.s u^ . ,-. ^- . ,,1 v ounty, he

2?

stipulated to the court's jurisdiction, and he sought affirmative relief from
the lower court.
As with his jurisdictional arguments, Robert's due process arguments
are wholly without merit. Judge Stott was under no obligation to respond to
Robert's twenty-six written questions under a federal Freedom of
Information Act request. Judge Stott also was not required at the December
1, 2006 hearing to answer Robert's questions or to explain to him how this
country's and this state's jurisprudential system works.
Robert's brief is long on rhetoric but is woefully short on meaningful
analysis. For all the reasons set forth herein, Robert's appeal should be
dismissed or denied, the decision of the lower court should be affirmed, and
this case should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION BECAUSE ROBERT DOES
NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO A DIRECT APPEAL OF THE CIVIL
CONTEMPT ORDER ISSUED AGAINST HIM.
The lower court properly entered its October 2 Order that Robert
owed child support, attorney's fees and costs. It also made clear that its
patience for Robert's ridiculous filings and repeated assertions of rejected
arguments had come to end. Robert was ordered to cease papering the file
with frivolous motions and documents not authorized by the rules. As found
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in the Contempt Order, Robert violated the October 2 Order, and he does not
contend otherwise.
All three elements for the finding of contempt have been met. First,
Mulder was clearly aware ol Uic ueiooci _ uiucr a.> -. .iiuh ,i,i: ; o. ;,.> iiisng,
In

hied In i

Nmliii

| I llijeelioib

mull Mull inn

IIIH

Mime I)e(ini(i*\e

Statement" (R 69 !•) Second, Mi ilder clearly ha d the ability tc comply w ith
the October 2 Order, particularly with respect lo provisions regarding the
filing of duplicative .notions and improper documents. ThinL Mi-Vier
obviously intentional K iailed : o cor^pi^ ^..^ ?u. -M.iu\ *. L li<n J lake v.

- •

•

'

'

;

: e *

. t •»

.

.

.':

', -

to coerce an individual to comply with a court order given for the benefit of
another party or to compensate an aggrieved party for injuries resulting from
the failure to comply with an r.rd-r Y<m jjah\

' ^ 9 P.?d at 11*P

"\

remedial purpose is Indicated w hen the contemnor is allowed to purge

civil contempt occurs where amounts arc ordered LO be paid to the other
party rather than to the court. See id. at 1168, note 5.
In this ca se, 'the Contempt Order specifically pro\ M J

"The C vart

hereby orders that the Defendant shall ->ci'w liiiccn dav. \i\ ii... I/uin County
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jail for such contempt. The Defendant may purge himself of this contempt
and avoid this sentence if by December 31, 2006 he [brings his child support
payments current and pays Tamara's attorney's fees and costs].55 Thus, the
Finding of Contempt and Order was a finding of civil contempt.
As a general rule, civil contempt orders are not appealable as a matter
of right, because they are only interlocutory orders. Id. at 1147, but see note
5. Robert has not petitioned this court for permission to file an interlocutory
appeal as provided in Utah R. App. Proc. 5. Because Robert has not properly
petitioned the court for an interlocutory appeal, this appeal should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
II.

THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE ROBERT
FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESERVE THE ISSUES ON APPEAL IN
CONNECTION WITH THE CONTEMPT ORDER.
The Contempt Order is the only ruling before this court. As the record

below makes clear, Robert filed no memorandum in opposition to the
motion for order to show cause. At the hearing, Robert submitted no
significant legal arguments on his own behalf; instead, choosing to trying to
be clever and engage Judge Stott in an answer and question session.
Because Robert did not timely present his jurisdictional, due process,
or "I-am-a-sovereign-freeman" arguments at the contempt hearing in a
manner which brought such arguments to the consciousness of the lower
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court, those issuer were waived and not properly preserved below.
Accordingly, Robert's appeal should be dismissed. See Holmstrom v. C.R.
England, Inc., 2000 UTAH C

\*

°19 a< ^[26; Salt'Lake

County v.

ISSUES RELix i LL> TO HIE FINAL DI V ORCE DECREE; SEVERAL
INTERMEDIATE ORDERS, OR HIS RULE 60(b)(4) MOTION
CANNOT BE HEARD BECAUSE ROBERT FAILED TO PROPERLY
SEEK APPELLATE REVIEW OR DID NOT ALLOW THE LOWER
COURT TO RULE.
As can be clearly seen from the record below;.,. Robert has continually
filed document after document raising every imaginable argument to the

lower court for consideration, hi addition, appeals from subsequent orders
will not provide grounds for reviews of final judgments or orders where no
timely appeal was taken. See Griffin v. Draper, 649 P.2d 123, 126 (Wash.
App. 1982); Seattle-F ii st 1 National Bank t \ A im shall, 55 1 I"!l 2d 352, 355
( \ > J ish;

i i • 1 9 ;r 5 ) ; t ;•( '< >; I Wilt I • i :" A tit I Cei iti tr) In s- G > ,635 P 2d U 7 ,

418-19 (Utah 1981).
Robert cannot properly raise challenges to ihe Decree because he
never appealed that final order. Robert cannot raise challenges to the lower
court's i August 30, 2006 ruli rig because wc :-kd no petition seeking an
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interlocutory review. Robert cannot raise issues related to the October 2
Order, because as with the Contempt Order, Robert was required to petition
this court for an interlocutory review within twenty days of the October 2
Order, as required by Appellate Rule 5(a). He failed to do so.
Instead, of petitioning this court for an interlocutory review, in several
cases, Robert moved to set aside a ruling, moved for reconsideration, or
moved for more definite statements. Such motions violated the "law of the
case" doctrine. As.this court has noted: "The law of the case doctrine is not a
limit on judicial power, but only a practice designed 'to protect both court
and parties against the burdens of repeated reargument by indefatigable
diehards." In re Adoption ofE.K,

2004 UT App 419 at ^[22, cert granted

123 P.3d 815, remanded on other grounds 2006 UT 36 (emphasis added).
Here, Judge Stott entered Findings and Conclusions that the court had
jurisdiction. In the October 2 Order, Judge Stott attempted to explain to
Robert why Robert's motions were being denied and gave Robert the legal
rationale for his prior rulings. Judge Stott had every right to protect the
integrity of his court from Robert's repeated re-argument. If Robert
disagreed with those rulings, he was under an obligation to seek an
interlocutory review of that Order. He failed to do so.
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Finally, Robert cannot rely upon the arguments made in his Rule
60(b)(4) motion as a basis for preservation of the issues on appeal. As noted
above, that motion was filed on October 25, 2006 and the opposing
memorandum was fikd {November .?. _uuo. KoDeri never requested an oral
Mil-

-

'

.

;

time he filed h is Notice of A ppea 1 in this case I hi is having fa iled to give
the lower court an opportunity to rule on his Rule 60(b)(4) motion, he cannot
rely *>n il to preserve Ins issues on appeal.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY E X E R C I S E D SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION.
A • The Lower Court's J urisdictional Findings Can in 1 Uv < Jiallen^ed
When Robert Failed to Marshal the Evidence,
Tamara admits that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be bestowed by
agreement of the parties and that jurisdiction may be challenged at any time.
Nevertheless, the questior ~^ appeal is simply ^vthc*" "ho lower court
properly held that it did have subject matter jurist!;,; turn. I no answer .. .. .,»,
affirma ti < z
As with his other arguments, Mulder has failed to meet the procedural
requirements necessary to assert his lack <-f jurisdiction claim. More
particularly, Mulder U challenging both the findings ^f fl;ots regarding
jurisdiction and the lower court's conclua*.-, , •,- .l(w w hued thereto.
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It is well-recognized that when an appellant seeks to challenge
findings of facts, he is first required to marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the court's findings
are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence.
See State ex. rel L.M., 2001 UT App 314 at ^[14. In order to meet this
requirement, the appellant "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports
the very findings appellant resists." Id, citing West Valley City v. Majestic
Inv. Co, 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct App. 1991).
When an appellant fails to properly discharge his duty to marshal, the
appellate court must assume that "'the evidence introduced at trial
adequately supported the findings,' and accordingly, affirm the findings as
written." Id. at ^[15, citing Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, at ^[34; Barber v.
Barber, 792 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)("We do not reverse a trial
court's findings of fact unless the appellant marshals the evidence relevant to
the finding and then shows the finding to be clearly erroneous.").
Robert has failed to marshal the evidence which supported the lower
court's conclusion that jurisdiction was properly exercised. Robert fails to
quote the Stipulation and the Findings and Conclusions which Robert agreed
would not be disputed. (R. 297 at ^fl). He fails to quote Tamara's affidavits
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which established her legal residency m Utah County, lie iLils to cite his
own affidavit wherein he acknowledges rluii T.' -v^a never established
residency in any other location. Because Mulder has failed to marshal the
evidence supporting u.e lower court.'s factual findings, this court must affirm
th e lo\ \ er coi ir t s j i irisdictiona 1 findings
B. The Lower i^ourt Properly Found that Tamara was a
Resident of Utah County•
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-1 provides that a district court can gram a
divorce where a petitioner has been "an actual and bona fide resident of this
state and of the co ui;r. ,\nere tne .icu^i ; > . ^ .,L ,.,
prior to the eomme*

- •

:u: ;i-ree months next
• determ ines that

an appeal has been -- y:\*v]y taken, 'the issue is whether the record below
supports a finding that 1 amara was an actual and bona fide resident of Utah
County as required by Section 30-3-1.
When a judgniciii

JUL>

been entered . y a cour of general jurisdiction,

'party attacking jurisdiction to prove its absence. See State v. \ rijil, 784 P.2d
1130, 1133 (Utah 1989). In deciding questions of jurisdiction, however, a
district court irm\ determine the issue on affidavits alone, permit discovery,
or hold an evidentiary l^,un\:j.

... niida\j;s or on other

documen tai y e \ rideii ce a Ion e, a i:i y dispi ites in the doci lmentary evidence are
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resolved in the plaintiffs favor. A trial court must not weigh the evidence in
the contradictory affidavits unless there is a hearing. See Neways, Inc. v.
McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422 (Utah 1997); Anderson v. American Soc. of
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990),
rehearing denied (1991).
As applied to this case, Tamara filed her affidavit asserting her
residency (R. 109 at \2). Further, although parties cannot agree to
jurisdiction, Robert's Stipulation to the entry of Finding No. 1 of the
Findings and Conclusions which stated that Tamara was an actual and bona
fide resident of Utah and had been a legal resident of Utah County for at
least three months prior to the filing of the Complaint also is considered as
documentary evidence. "A stipulation is an admission which "may not be
disregarded or set aside at will.'" Rivera v. State Farm Mut Auto Ins. Co.,
2000 UT 539, at^fll. "'[A stipulation] has all the binding effect of findings
of facts and conclusions of law made by the court upon the evidence. The
rationale is that the stipulation constitutes an agreement of the parties that all
the facts necessary to support it ... pre-existed and would be sustained by
available evidence, had not the agreement of the parties dispensed with the
taking of evidence."5 Davis v. Davis, 2001 UT App. 225, at <ftl0, citation
omitted. See Yeargin v. Auditing Div., 2001 UT 11, at ^[20. "[Bjecause the
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facts stated in a stipulation are conclusive, a stipulation of fact cannot be met
by evidence tending to show that the facts are otherwise." State v.
United States Currency,

73J30

2001 I IT 67, at^jl 2, Stipulations should particularly

be enforced when, as here, Rwi>ul e m e u d hm- - vith the advice oi ins
coun sel See Yet irgii i, si ipn i, at' } fl 2; Rl \ 7ei c i5 si ipi a, at f l l

of Default Judgment, Robert has clearly filed various affidavits and other
documents wherein h
by Neways,

supra

iH

e: aims (he lower court lacks jurisdiction
Anderson,

supra,

^ : taught

however, any disputes in the

the documentary evidence upon Judge Stott p^^<> • ruled that jurisdiction
existed. Those findings should not be reversed.
Although Tamara's affidavit alone is sufficient for the lower court to
exercise subject malic; junscaeiKhh , ; ^ ,.n cannot avoid \i\c eiieci < . ,;,:,

properly preserved below in connection with the Contempt Order and should
not be raised now. Nevertheless, substantively they also are without merit.

17

For the reasons stated in the October 2 Order, (here \>,n, no fraud or
misrepresentation in connection with the Stipulation and ; »• ' reach thereof
by Tamara. Further, for a finding of chircs •„ there mu.i be a showing by clear
37

As a matter of law, Tamara was a bona fide and actual resident of
Utah County prior to the filing of the Complaint. As described in her
affidavits (R. 109 and R. 396), there is no question but that Tamara and
Robert lived in Utah County for virtually all of their marriage until July 20,
2005, when Robert took Tamara and their children to a trailer on Robert's
brother's property in Clearlakes, California. Tamara and the children lived in
those temporary conditions for only a few weeks, until Robert advised
Tamara and the children that he no longer wanted to be married. Almost
immediately thereafter, Tamara and the children were picked up by her
brother who was living in Eureka, California. Tamara and her family stayed
with Tamara's brother for a short period of time, then moved into a hotel,
and then entered into a month-to-month rental agreement for some premises
that provided a little more room for she and her family and while she
attempted to determine what to do with the catastrophe that her life and the
lives of her children had become after being abandoned by Robert.

and convincing evidence that the agreement was unjust, unconscionable, or
illegal. The Stipulation was none of those things. Further, the defense of
duress cannot be predicated upon demands which are lawful, or the threat to
do that which the demanding party has a legal right to do. Tamara had every
right to seek a permanent protective order from Robert and her seeking such
protection cannot be a basis for Robert's claims of duress. See Liebelt v.
Liebelt, 801 P2d 52, 55 (Idaho App. 1990)(citations omitted); In re Adoption
o/B.T.D., 2003 UT App 99, atffi[20and 23.
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Tamara elected .o return to Utah County, her home. Her two oldest
sons continued to sta> in the rented apartment in California for one more
month before also returning to Utah.
1

jurposes of determining jurisdiction, the critical

.. . ., ,\m:

ramara n :: v n established any perma nent address or residence i n an}
location outside of Utah. Her residence and domicile continued to be in Utah
County.
The law H TT+nb i- clear A person may onK~ have one residence and
/esiuence does v,o+ change uiaii .iwmicue nas enangcu

:

\\ contingent

from an established domicile will not woik a change of domicile. • • • •
until "the contingency occurs." Gardner v. Gardnei •, 222 P.2d 1055, 1057
(Utah 1950). This is consistent with the laws of other states which hold that
once a domicile is established, ;; ^uiiinues until a new one is actually
acquired,

I*MMI

lliuii[.'li i

I'»«K()

tm.i) l*c absent Inn i Ihe slid: uf

riinnal

domicile. See e. g. McD »:?(dl v McDougall, 961 P.2< i 382, 384 (Wyo 1 °08 >
See also, Utah Code Ann. §20A-2-105 (4)(j)(ii) and (iii) regarding residency
for voting purposes which provide: "There can only be one residence [and] a
residence cannot be lost until another is gained..'"
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A court's jurisdiction is established at the commencement of the case.
Once acquired, a court continues to have jurisdiction even if later events
occur which would have denied the court jurisdiction had the occurred prior
to the filing of the lawsuit. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 and
note 6 (1970); St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.
283, 289-90 (1938); F. Aderete General Contractors v. United States, 715
F.2d 1476, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1983)("[Jurisdiction is determined at the time
the suit is filed and after vesting, cannot be ousted by subsequent events,
including action by the parties."); and Patel v. Kansas State Board of
Healing Arts, 920 P.2d 477, 479 (Kan. App. 1996).
Thus, the lower court had jurisdiction to hear the action filed by
Tamara, who was a long-time resident of Utah County. The fact that Tamara
temporarily stayed in several locations in California or that she subsequently
decided to move to Massachusetts nearly three months after the filing of the
complaint never deprived the Utah court of jurisdiction.
C. The Attempted Removal of this Case to the "Pembina Group's
"Court" Did Not Divest the Lower Court of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction.
Robert's effort to avoid the lower court's jurisdiction is based upon
the false premise that the Pembina Group has sovereignty as an Indian
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tribe.''"1 Unless ""the United States government recognizes its sovereignty,
however, the Pembina Group members are like aii\ odLer iringe gro"up
claiming to be outside federal and state law.
Whether a group constitutes a "tribe' "' ' is a matter that is ordinarily
f

f^r; '<

courts will defer to their judgment. UnifcJ SV./zv*-

Wall.) 407, 419; Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 1496
( D . r Cir. 1997), Idrogo v. US. A>-mv. IS V. Supp. 2,1 25, 28 m.D.C. 1998).
Federal courts identity uiilia... . v i\ leience to an » JI vidual's decree of

States v. Bronchaw

- >* • • v ' \* n • -• > r

..

.-

* ,7 i u

859 (1979). In this case, the Pembina Group L not a federally-recognized
tribe, and indeed, the Pembina Group denies even seeking or requiring such
recognition for it to assert its own "sovereignty" and ~o flout the laws of the
I killed Stales unci 'I Kali.

'

,

'

' '

"• ^ . •'

' ' . •'

To onliiJiH t" tif> nllej'.ed slain;* as member of Ihc Pcnihina I imup,
Mulder asserts that he is, in fact, one-quarter Indian, it ib weil-recognized,
however, that even an individual who is geneticall} -n Tndfn^ h\ \ ]•: ?ie* a
18

This court should recall that in the Stipulation, Mulder conceded that the
Pembina Group was not a federally-recognized tribe. As wifh the other
provisions of the Stipulation, Robert should be barred from now seeking to
contradict his earlier agreement.
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member of an existing recognized tribe will not be treated any differently
than any other citizen of a state. See United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19
(9 Cir. 1974). Thus, in the absence of Federal recognition, the members of
the Pembina Group, even if some of them should actually be part Indian, are
subject to the laws of the land, including federal and Utah law.19
Not only is the Pembina Group not a federally-recognized tribe, but
also is not a "treaty tribe." None of the foregoing is altered by the fact that
the United States government entered into the "Treaty of the Delawares"
which was signed in 1778 during the midst of the Revolutionary War or the
"Old Crossing Treaty" in 1863 as Robert argues.
In the 1778 Treaty of the Delawares, the Delaware Indian tribe and
the thirteen colonies/states agreed to ally with one another against the
British. In exchange for the Delaware Indians' consent of free passage over
Delaware land, the newly-proclaimed country agreed to allow the Delaware
Indians to keep their land. There is nothing in that treaty which

19

It is also clear that even a recognized tribe has no jurisdiction over nonmembers outside of the tribe's reservation. See Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). Tamara disputes that she ever voluntarily joined
the Pembina Group, and Mulder contends otherwise, Nevertheless, in this
case, the Pembina Group does not even have a reservation and thus even if
the Pembina Group was a landless Indian tribe, it still could not exercise
jurisdiction beyond a recognized Indian reservation.
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acknowledges any treaty rights of Chief Little Shell, his tribe, or even any
land to which his tribe laid claim. It has no relevance whatsoever.
In the "Old Crossing Treaty of 1863" the United States government
agreed to pay certain amounts to several Indian tribes including a tribe
headed by "Chief Little Shell.55 There is no question that the United States
government failed to pay Chief Little Shell and his tribe the amounts
provided for under that treaty.
The Old Crossing Treaty did not grant or recognize any sovereignty
rights to Chief Little Shell over any particular area of land. Even if it did,
however, Mulder and the Pembina Group would still be required to show
that they are, in fact, lineal descendants of Chief Little Shell's tribe. See
United States v. Oregon, 29 F.3d 481, 485 (9th Cir. 1994)("Our law requires
that [Indians claiming rights under treaties] must trace a continuous and
defining political or cultural characteristic to the entity that was granted the
treaty rights.55); United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d
543, 548 (10th Cir. 2001)(court rejects argument of Indian plaintiffs that
because they were able to show the fact of descent from members of the
Shawnee tribe, they were not entitled to federal recognition because there
was no showing that the plaintiffs have "maintained their identity with the
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Shawnee tribe and [have] continued to exercise that tribe's sovereign
authority up to the present day.55)
The descendants of Chief Little Shell's band disbursed to different
areas of the country. Several of the real descendants of Chief Little Shell's
tribe brought suit to recover sums due them for violation of the Old Crossing
Treaty. In Delorme v. United States, 354 F.3d 810 (8th Cir. 2004). the court
determined that the Pembina Group had no standing in such a suit. The court
acknowledged that there were at least two groups that claimed to be
descended from the Pembina led by Chief Little Shell— (a) the Little Shell
Band of Chippewa Indians of North Dakota (also known as the Little Shell
Pembina Band of North America) and (b) the Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa
Indians of Montana. See Delorme, 354 F.3d at 814, note 6. The court
indicated that "The Montana Tribe appears to be the successor in interest to
the Little Shell Band of Chippewa Indians ... in the 1970s Indian Claims
Commission litigation [which awarded $52,527,337.97 to a number of
Indian bands, including the Little Shell Bands]. Id. and at 813.
Mr. Ronald Delorme also joined in that lawsuit to participate in the
recovery of the amounts due the descendants of Chief Little Shell's tribe.
The courts, however, declined to recognize Mr. Delorme's alleged tribe as a
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rightful successors to Chief Little Shell's tribe. Delorme v. United States,
354 F.3d 810, 814 note 6 (8th Cir. 2004).
In the lower court, Robert admitted that Mr. Delorme was once the
head of the Pembina Group. See R. 172 at 9.

Thus, the Pembina Group to

which Mulder claims allegiance, cannot show any continuous ties to Chief
Little Shell, and the Pembina Group is not a "treaty tribe."
Under these circumstances, it would indeed be anomalous for Robert
to have more rights, autonomy, sovereignty and authority than a Native
American who is a member of a recognized tribe or a member of a federally
recognized tribe.
Based upon the foregoing, any document filed by Mulder in any way
relating, referring to, regarding, or relying Pembina is a legal nullity with no
force or effect. This is especially true of the purported "removal" to the
"Federal Circuit Court" of the Pembina Group.
D. The Attempted Removal of this Case to the Utah Federal Court Did
Not Divest the Lower Court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction*
Absent a valid Notice of Removal, a state court has continuing
jurisdiction to enter judgments and decrees even prior to any ruling upon
20

Robert alleges that Mr. Delorme was removed from his tribal office as
chief because of his involvement with an insurance scam and then that the
other members of the tribal council were removed because of improper use
of funds. Mr. Delorme, however, still operates a Pembina website apparently
failing to acknowledge his dismissal. See R. 255 at Exhibit 13.
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removal by a federal court. As stated in Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Stevens, 312 U.S. 563, 566, 569 (1941): "The rule that proceedings in the
state subsequent to the petition for removal are valid if the suit was not fact
removable is the logical corollary of the proposition that such proceedings
are void if the cause was removable.... [W]e must conclude that the state
court had jurisdiction to enter the default judgment.55 See generally, Jones v.
Cargill Nutrena Feed Div., 665 F. Supp. 907, 908 (S.D. Ala. 1987)(aAll
requirements of the federal statute must be fulfilled to effect removal. Until
such time, the state court retains jurisdiction over the case and may
proceed.55); Bell v. Burlington Northern RR Co., 738 P.2d 949 (Okla App.),
cert denied (19S6), cert, denied 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
In response to the Notice of Removal filed by Robert, on January 4,
2006, the Hon. Ted Stewart, as United States District Court Judge, dismissed
the Notice of Removal on two grounds: (1) the court lacks jurisdiction to
issue divorce decrees; and (2) Mulder's Notice of Removal was untimely
since a notice of removal must be filed within thirty days of service of the
complaint.21

21

Mulder was served with the Complaint on September 13, 2005, but his
Notice of Removal was not filed until November 4, 2005.
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For the foregoing reasons, Judge Stott was not divested of jurisdiction
when Robert his notice of removal to the Utah federal court.
VL THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED IN PERSONAM
JURISDICTION OVER ROBERT.
The lower court properly exercised in personam jurisdiction over
Robert on four different bases. First, Robert was served with the Summons
and Complaint in this action. See Meyers v. Interwest Corp,, 632 P.2d 879,
880 (Utah 1981). Second, in the Stipulation, Robert stipulated to the findings
that the court had subject matter and in personam jurisdiction. Unlike subject
matter jurisdiction, parties can stipulate to making themselves subject to the
courts of a particular state. See Barnard v. Wasserman. 855 P.2d 243, 248
(Utah 1993); Voicelink Data Services v. Datapulse, 937 P.2d 1158, 1162
(Wash. App. 1997). Third, Robert has filed several motions seeking
affirmative relief from the court below, including his motion to quash (R.
124 or 138), his Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation on the grounds of fraud
and misrepresentation (R. 331); his attempt to have the court issue
subpoenas, and other motions, albeit improper ones. See Nunley v. Nunley,
757 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Finally, Robert has admitted his
strong ties to Utah County through the ownership of real property. Robert is
clearly subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the lower court.
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VII. DUE PROCESS WAS AFFORDED IN CONNECTION WITH
THE CONTEMPT ORDER SINCE IT CONSTITUTED "DIRECT
CONTEMPT.9'
Robert incorrectly contends that his due process rights have been
violated in seemingly countless ways throughout the entire proceedings
below. As aptly stated in Robinson v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1144, 1147 (4th Cir.
1986),
It is our preference to address every facially arguable
contention made but ones so farfetched they tend to denigrate
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution properly
should not be dignified by detailed response. To do so would
suggest substance where none, in fact, exists and would tend to
trivialize a document which should be reserved for situations
where an argument of reasonable weight can be advanced.
Many of Robert's due process claims are so clearly facetious that for
the sake of brevity and so as not to make them appear as though they have
substance, they will not be addressed here. Several legal principles,
however, cut across virtually all of Robert's contentions.
First, the "Constitution requires due process of law, it does not require
an endless number of opportunities for one to assert his rights." Silas v.
Babbitt, 96 F.3d 355, 358 (9th Cir. 1996). "[Accepting one party's argument
over the other is not an abuse of discretion in the absence of substantial
proof that the trial court abused its discretion." Prince v. Bear River Mut.
Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, at ^[55. Robert seems to believe that his "due process"
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rights were violated because Judge Stott refused to reconsider his prior
decisions that rejected Robert's arguments. That position has no merit.
Second, Robert was not denied due process rights because the lower
court did not give him special treatment after Robert chose to represent
himself at the contempt hearing and may have lacked sufficient legal
knowledge. In rejecting similar claims, this court stated:
"As a general rule, a party who represents himself will be held
to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any
qualifiedAmember of the bar....55 Although a pro se litigant
"should be accorded every consideration that may reasonably
be indulged,55 a litigant "acting as his own attorney does not
require the court to interrupt the course of proceedings to
translate legal terms, explain legal rules, or otherwise attempt to
redress the ongoing consequences of the party's decision to
function in a capacity for which he is not trained....
In re Cannatella, 2006 UT App 89, at ^5 (citations omitted).
With respect to the exercise of due process at the December 1, 2006
contempt hearing itself, Utah Code Ann. §78-32-3 sets forth the procedures
to be used in cases of direct and indirect contempt. That statute provides:
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and
presence of the court . . ., it may be punished summarily, for
which an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in
such immediate view and presence, adjudging that the person
proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt, and that he
be punished as prescribed in Section 78-32-10 hereof.
The Utah Supreme Court previously held that this statute provides due
process to the contemnor. Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1169-70.
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In this case, Robert's violation of the lower court's October 2 Order to
cease filing improper motions and documents that continued to raise
arguments previously denied, was committed in the direct view of the lower
court; and thus, the lower court properly imposed its sanctions without
necessity of any further hearing. Robert was not denied due process in
connection with the contempt hearing or the Contempt Order.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing, Robert's appeal should be dismissed or the
rulings of the lower court affirmed. This case should then be remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings as necessary to enforce its orders.
In addition, Tamara should be awarded her reasonable attorney's fees
and costs incurred in responding to Robert's appeal pursuant to Rule 33 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This appeal is a continuation of
Robert's all-out assault on the judicial system and is designed to delay his
paying his child support and increases the costs of litigation to Tamara
thereby further economically harming her and his children. It should not be
tolerated by this court any more than in the lower court.
DATED this 8th day of June, 2007

^lMpf\Hard
Counsel for Appellee Tamara Caputo
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 8th day of June, 2007,
two true and complete copies of the Brief of the Appellee were served via
certified mail, postage prepaid to:
Mr. Robert Mulder
c/o P.O. Box 1098
Clearlake Oaks, California 95423
m
DATED this 8>th
day of June, 2007

Appell
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH-PROVO DIVISION

TAMARA ROWLEY MULDER
Petitioner/Plaintiff

FINDING OF CONTEMPT
AND
ORDER

vs.

ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER
Civil No. 054401811
Respondent/Defendant

Judge: Stott
Commissioner: Patton

A hearing on Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion for Order to Show Cause Why
Defendant Should Not Be Held in Contempt for Failing to Comply with the Orders of
this Court was held Friday, December 1, 2006 at 9:15 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by
Stephen T. Hard, and Mr. Mulder appeared representing himself pro se.
Having reviewed the record, the memorandum in support of the motion for order
to show cause, and having heard the arguments of counsel and Mr. Mulder,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

Ml

1. The Court finds that the Defendant has violated this Court's prior rulings, decrees,
and orders. More particularly, the Court finds that:
a. The Defendant has failed to pay child support as ordered by the Court. The
December 7, 2005 Stipulation, Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law,
and the Decree of Divorce provided for child support payments of $1,450
per month. Based upon the Affidavit of Stephen T. Hard, the Defendant
only made voluntary child support payments of $1,700 through May 2006.
Further based upon Mr. Hard's Affidavit, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts successfully recovered an additional $4,852.44 during the
period June 29, 2006 through September 9, 2006 and received an
additional payment of $53.57 on November 20,2006. Interest on the late
payments has been calculated at the statutory interest rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum. As of December 31,2006, the Defendant will
owe a total of $13,385.10 in past due child support and accrued interest.
b. The October 2, 2006 Order of the Court warned the Defendant to cease
raising arguments that have been previously ruled upon and denied by the
Court. In violation of that Order, the Defendant has continued to raise
specious arguments that this Court lacks jurisdiction and that his due
process rights have been violated.
2. The Court has the authority to compel obedience to its orders as provided in Utah
Code Ann. §78-7-5(4). The Court finds that the Defendant's violation of the
October 2, 2006 Order was a continuation of a pattern of defiance to this Court's
rulings and orders. The Court finds that the Defendant's violation of the October
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• the .ability to comply with this Court's orders, but chose to continue to file
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3. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the Defendant is ;*ui!tv of contempt
.
4

under Utah Code Ann. §78-32-1.
The ("ouil ln'irln *inK-rs thai Ihc Ddcndnnt shall s u v fifteen days in lln* 1 ll.ih
County jail for such contempt. The Defendant may purge himself of this contempt

... Brings his rhild support payment*; current dinMieh the end of the year
(ijK.iAwiiL; j.; iiicipai and interest) as set forth in paragraph la above.
b. Pays attorney * s fees and costs to the Plaintiff

••••:: i w i - ho . • *

$1,631.55 as supported in the Affidavit of M. i lard filed with the Court,
whin] •

• - finds is fair and reasonable.

Near the conclusion ol the hearing, Mr. Hard advised the Court that 1\ it. Mi llder
had sei vedhim w ith requests for admissions, interrogatories, and requests for production
of documents. Such discovery is in violation of this Court's Divorce Decree, as the
Defendant ah^

KJICW

imee<ACpre\ iou^i) caused subpoenas to be issued that were

quashed for the same reasons. Mr. Hard and the Plaintiff are not reqi lired to respond to
any discovery requests from the Defendant.
• . > ' • . ;rl .-\ - h - - v r, • .? i,; -. •

.K

.

\ . _ ,..

the (lourf's ond ruling. Such a Notice of Appeal is premature and does not deprive this
(' : •; .;fi;.-: i-' •-^

• ^ntei th is Order. See Anderson v. Schwenciim^a. ,. \ r ..,: ' -'

1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); In re King's Estate, 264 P.2d 586, 591 (Ca. Ct. App. 195 M:

7

:

Southern Nevada Homebuilders Assoc, v. North Las Vegas, 913 P.2d 1276, 1279-80
(Nev. 1996).
7. As requested by the Defendant at the hearing, his Motion for Void Judgment was
scheduled to be heard on January 8, 2006 at 2:00 p.m.. The Defendant's Notice of
Appeal, while premature, is deemed effective after and as of the date this Order is
entered. See Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, unless the
Defendant dismisses his Notice of Appeal, this Court will not have the opportunity to
consider his motion.
8. Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Defendant is
advised that his appeal of the Court's Order will not automatically stay the enforcement
of this Order. The Defendant will have the opportunity to pay the amounts set forth above
or be incarcerated as set forth above; unless he meets the requirements of Rule 27 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §77-20-10.
8. The hearing scheduled for January 8,2007 at 2:00 p.m. shall be converted to one
for a hearing on the status of the enforcement of this Court's Order.
DATED this £ * day of December, 2006.
BY THE COURT:
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Exhibit 1 - Ordei Striking Defendant's l'iling^, Imposing
11
nctions, Authorizing Interim Judgment, and I )en> ing
Other Motions, October 2, 2006

Fourth JutfoW r/islrict Cou-t
8f Utah *>jp.ty, Stale oi Utah

Stephen T. Hard (USB No. 1359)
725 Chaparral Dr.
Murray, Utah 84123
Tel: 801-918-2800
Fax: 801-327-5565
Email: s.t.hard@att.net

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH--PROVO DIVISION

TAMARA ROWLEY MULDER
Petitioner/Plaintiff

ORDER STRIKING DEFENDANT'S
FILINGS; IMPOSING SANCTIONS;
AUTHORIZING INTERIM JUDGMENT
AND DENYING OTHER MOTIONS

vs.

ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER
Civil No. 054401811
Respondent/Defendant

Judge: Stott
Commissioner: Patton

The Court has issued its Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion to Strike; Motion for Sanctions;
and Renewed Motion for Interim Partial Summary Judgment filed on August 14,2006.
This Order Striking Defendant's Pleadings; Imposing Sanctions; and Authorizing Interim
Judgment is entered into pursuant to that Ruling.
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is GRANTED. The Defendant's following filings are
hereby stricken: The Affidavit of Revocation of Signature for Cause; the Asservation
and Declaration of Status; the Notice of Non-Appearance and Request for Information
Re: FOIA, Fifth Amendment; Request for Information-Second Request; Letter to Judge

Stott; Verified Statement of Fact and Motion to Quash Petitioner's Motion for Interim
Judgment; Notice of Default Three Da\ Notice in v au. iv -i^c I?L Lv.hu, ( ii iVutioner
Three Day Notice to Ci ire; and Final Defai lit.
2.. Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions for fees and costs incurred in responding to the
various filings that hav e been stricken is GR AN 'I ED. I he Defendant is ordered to pay
Plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $ I 433.85.
3, Plaintiffs Motion for Interim,, Partial Summary i udgment is GRAN1 ED. lute rim
Judgment is hereby granted lo Iho Plaintiff and, against the nefendant in the total sum of
$9,595.05, all with interest thereon lor past due child support through May 2006,
sanctions imposed OB Ap:

-.-••. : .: •
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Plaintiff is hereby permitted to seek further orders and relief with respect to any
other damages, sanctions, rei id, ana orders as may be necessary to enforce the
Stipulation of me parties, the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, the Divorce
Decree, and the Addendum to Divorce Decree that have been entered in this case.
AlfhoijjLiJi liiuiMiiil lii iliif so llie l "mill shall set forth (lie basis nl'ihi nilings as
follows:
1. This Court has in personam and subject matter jurisdiction o x ei the Defendant,
Robert Matthew Mulder, in connection with the divorce proceeding and all subsequent
proceedings related thereto.
a

' "(fill (1o<lc Ann. {JTO-VI provides that in order for 'this Court to hear a
divorce proceeding, the plaintiff in any such action, must have been a •
bona Jidc icskleiif of I Hah ( Yiunty lot at least three months prior In Ihc
filing of the Petition.

b.

The Plaintiff, Tamara Rowley Caputo, f/k/a Tamara Rowley Mulder
was a resident of Utah County, State of Utah at the time the Petition for
Divorce was filed and for the three months preceding such filing.

c.

This finding is true even if the Plaintiff did not live in Utah County at
the time the Petition was filed. More particularly, it is undisputed that
Plaintiff and Defendant were married for over 20 years. It also is
undisputed that Plaintiff and Defendant lived in Utah County for many
years prior and up to July 20,2005.

d.

On that date, the undisputed evidence is that Defendant took Plaintiff
and several of their children to live in a trailer on Defendant's brother's
property in or near Clearlake Oaks, California. While the Defendant
disagrees with the characterization of why he moved his family to
California or whether he subsequently "abandoned" them there, there is
no disagreement that the trailer was not meant to be a permanent
residence for Plaintiff. It also is not disputed that shortly after August
23, 2005 when Defendant text-messaged the Plaintiff indicating his
unhappiness with the marriage, that Plaintiff and the children then with
her, were moved to Eureka, California by Plaintiffs brother. Finally, it
is undisputed that Plaintiff only lived in temporary facilities for at most
several months, filed for divorce on or about September 7, 2005, and
then returned to Utah. After returning to Utah, whether Plaintiff lived
temporarily in Utah County or in Salt Lake County as Defendant has
contended makes no difference to the question of in personam and
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subject matter jurisdiction. The indisputable facts are that the Plaintiff
established n<> legal donnuk wr legal residency outside of Utah County
b-'1*- . p • • PI * -h ' :* !

, 5 2005 and when the ;

.

Petition was filed in September 2005.
e'

[ I tali la;\ \ Is cleat: that a person oil ly has one dom icile an dthat domicile
o r res|(jenCy

, ( | oes n o t change u.ixtil a new permanent residency or

domicile is established. See Gardner v. Gardner, <L. _
{(If.ili l ' ) M I ) ; s c e a i s M

%

. a ;; : : . i • • 7

: " - §20A-2-105(.J tfYii) andflii).

Even if Plaintiff had intended lo establish residency in another state, she
f;r!..d l-1

' vlcit .

.-^.a.iu- 5/< ' •*

a- lit. * r.u\

legally domiciled OK*- nie O- f ifah prior to !he filing of the Petition for
divorce. >, ^ , .^a: .; naa a,.a ^ .ana a.a a ,y oilier ie^ai aoin^ile or
residency, she continued to be a resident of Utah County; and thus, she
was entitled to file this divorce proceeding before this Court, and this

has made . lear. a court's jurisdiction is established al the
commencement ul'tlie ease, Una: jequued, a uuiif ivnlmucs to lia\c
jurisdiction even if later events" occur which would have denied the
com t jurisdiction had they occurred prior lu .no Jiimg ui me .uvwvua. See
Rosadu *

>A.;,ILL^,

- ^ / U.S. 397,405 and note 6 (1970); St. Paul

Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. -283, 289-90 (1938)
£

\

- .-. iCi d.'M. - i- :• \la--:. '

'"'I

:

'^rncd:-

i o :a„ aau the

in personam and subject matter jurisdiction of this Court. By prior
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ruling of the Court, Plaintiff was entitled to the entry of the Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce. Pursuant to
the agreement of the parties as contained in the December 7,2005
Stipulation between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the Addendum to
the Divorce Decree caused Plaintiff to relinquish certain rights and
protections that otherwise would have been granted to her in the
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce.
Further, in reliance upon the Stipulation, Plaintiff did not pursue a
hearing upon a permanent restraining order scheduled before
Commissioner Patton on that date. Defendant was represented by
competent counsel at the time he executed the Stipulation, and he is
estopped from taking positions contrary to that Stipulation where
Plaintiff gave up rights in accordance therewith.
In the Stipulation, the Defendant agreed that the Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law and the Divorce Decree could be entered and
would not be challenged, including, but not limited to the findings and
conclusions regarding this Court's jurisdiction. Based upon that
Stipulation, Defendant is estopped from challenging this Court's
jurisdiction further.
Not only did Plaintiff give up certain rights that she otherwise would
have been entitled to, but in reliance upon the Defendant's Stipulation
that jurisdiction would not be contested and in reliance upon the entry of
the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of
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Divorce, plaintiff re-married Michael Caputo in Massachusetts shortly
after the Decree of Divorce was entered. I Jnder those circumstances,, the
' Defendant is fill ther estopped from contesting the ji irisdiction of this
Court.
i.

The Defendant's violin <n

.;* • ...i......

i, Ins continued challenges to

this Col ir t's ji irisdiction, and his continued assertion that he is not
. subject to-this Court's jurisdiction are without merit and have subjected'
the Uclcnrliint U> lliu sanctions -.•• .

^

'• \: .-ontinued

challenges to this Court's jurisdictu m will he deemed contempt and may
subject liu- iJciciidanl u> iu;ther sanctions.
Defendar • '

:

• ^ with the Clerk of this Court are improper.

" our judicial system, any party has the right to represent himself. Mr.
\

. , • ,p -,:.,p; • . - , .: - 1. •-

j ,-j • •• : -jiv-ivv chose

to w'dnlravv from further representation. Mi Mulder has failed to
appoint new counsel, and he has chosen In cniiliiuu In represent
himself.
1:

Any party to a civil proceeding, whether represented by counsel or
• 'rcnr« ient- •*> himsHf i . \^r:r -d to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

c

The I Huh Rules oi t V, il Piveniifrc havr hrn] designed to ensii' - "just, speedy, arid inexpensive determination of every action." ' • • •
U.P.Civ.P

1

Poorer adherence tt> n,L

;.,.

:.es< ; . •

(-^'."••: •* :• vvr '; \ *-i ^ludonal and due process rights.

*•.„••••

d.

The Affidavit of Revocation of Signature for Cause; the Asservation
and Declaration of Status; the Notice of Non-Appearance and Request
for Information Re: FOIA, Fifth Amendment; Request for InformationSecond Request; Letter to Judge Stott; Verified Statement of Fact and
Motion to Quash Petitioner's Motion for Interim Judgment; Notice of
Default Three Day Notice to Cure; Notice of Default to Petitioner Three
Day Notice to Cure; and Final Default are all improper and without
merit, substantively and/or procedurally. The only motion that
Defendant filed was rendered moot by the prior order of the Court.

e.

Mr. Mulder's failure to understand or to agree with the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, judicial principles, or the bases of this Court's rulings
do not constitute denials of any Constitutional or due process rights. The
actions of the Court in these proceedings have been proper and in
accordance with the United States and Utah Constitutions, the Utah
Code Annotated, and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

f.

Any further contention that Mr. Mulder's Constitutional or due process
rights have been violated are without merit and any further contention
by the Defendant, Robert Matthew Mulder to the contrary may subject
the Defendant to contempt charges and further sanctions.

3. There are no grounds for nullifying the Stipulation, Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law, Decree of Divorce, or the Addendum to the Decree of Divorce,
a.

The Defendant has contended that he should not be bound by the
December 7, 2005 Stipulation he signed because he contends that at that
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time, the Plaintiff had moved to Massachusetts and that she failed to
advise the Court and the Defendant of any such Intended move in
nccordanu' willi Mini) rodr Ann § HI 1-171II I.
'I he Defendant's arguments are without merit. Section 30-3-37(1) Is
inapplicable to situations such a;-> f'hhy, wlick; llic 1 )u rcc of I )i\ ura; did
n o t S p ec j|y a

residence for the Plaintiff and/or where the Plaintiff had

relocated prior to the entry of the Divorce Decree. Further, Section 303 37(1) is not man datory,- since it specifically pro\ Ides that notice of
intent to relocate is to be provided "if possible 60 da\ s in advance." In
i: :.- >: •-

^p; x

•: • • - '.»*; '••

u:-v...-. x v -

>r tly • •

prior to the enir\ of ;IR* Dr.oree Decree, one thus, u was not possible
for 60 days advance notice to be given.
•:• •

Defendant claims tl .

:

• -

- '

!

v ; ^ e that Plaintiff and some

of the parties' children were in I -tah and thai ne was denied an
. opportunity to visit

. • :, r •i..

' " »

o;tr) of the Stipulation on.

December 7, 2005. I lie C-:in notes that The Stipulation makes no such
representation; ""the terms oj ihc :ai[. u ation aid not authorize the
Defendant to visit with the children without prior notice and without the
supervision of the Defendant's parents; and that the Defendant
subsequently moved to Ne* v York wh ichpla ced him closer to the
children than if they had remained in Utah while he lived in New York."
Thus, tix Mipuiaiiu;! . • ; . , . . *

other grounds.
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•.

.-

...... -U"

:..*

d.

Finally, the Court finds that even if there had been some reliance by the
Defendant upon a belief that his children were in Utah at the time he
signed the Stipulation, that misunderstanding does not constitute
sufficient grounds for nullifying the entire Stipulation, the Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law, the Decree of Divorce, and the
Addendum.

4. Sanctions against the Defendant are proper.
a.

As noted in the Ruling filed August 14,2006; the Defendant has
engaged in a course of conduct in violation of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and which are contrary to the very purposes of those rules.

b.

On April 5,2006; this Court quashed subpoenas that the Defendant
improperly caused to be issued and awarded Plaintiff her attorney's fees
in the amount of $1,161.20 incurred in moving to quash the subpoenas.

c.

Prior to the April 5, 2006 ruling, Defendant had improperly attempted to
remove these proceedings to the United States District Court for the
District of Utah and to the "Federal Circuit Court" for the "Pembina
Nation Little Shell Band of North America" which Defendant also
stipulated was not a federally-recognized Indian tribe or a "treaty tribe"
and in which Defendant's supposed membership affords him no
additional or different legal rights, liabilities, or immunities.

d.

Based upon the affidavits of Plaintiff s counsel, additional attorney's
fees and costs of $1,433.85 have been reasonably incurred in responding
to the Defendant's various filings that are stricken pursuant to this
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Order, in seeking further sanctions, and in drafting this Order and the
Interim Judgment.
i

TllninlilTis eiilillnl In Interim Judgment againsl llic Defendant in the amount of

$9,595.05. This amount is made up of three elements: First, it s undispute 1 that Hie terms
of the Divorce Decree obiiguteJ the jjeicntiau ; - \ . . . . . :
I<> I'll- '"laiiiliri" 'llii"' fu>m December 2005 through May 2006, Defendant should have
made child support payments of $8,700. Based upon the undi^ r.icd rw.idi- it:-o; :ne
PlaintifL i - ^ :^u<

i d ;*-'•• ^ ^ e - *

,x

' f • ' ^ 1 ^ May 2006. Thus,

Defendant owes back child support of $7,000 through May 2006. The second element is
the sanctions "o I lil J01.201. , ^ i c r c . ,..\-«.,. \

•-

<-\"v

-!

:;:.

i»(" $ 1,4"V1,K5 as provided in this Order.
6. Since the Ruling was issued, Defendant lias hied ;.*.<. ..vMUioi...; motions with
the I 'i mil 1 lie In si I:J .M

•:.

'

" "'

' u LU Reconsider Ruled Dated 8/30/06

and Order Dated 8/14/06" and the second is a document entitled "Motion to Reconsider
Order StrikingDefendan:

...

i. ,••-!.: x >*• * ••

•

• - r> .

<;e; i

Judgment/' along with e- * \ftidavit in Support of Motion to 'Reconsider ()rder Striking
Defendant's Filings Imposing Sanctions; and Authorizing Ink/nni Judgment. * Hnih of
the-e

•*•>.<

i• '

1 ;

:-'Toper and with respect to arguments previously raised

and addressed'above, are substantively without merit. Any remaining asserted grounds

in

for reconsidering any ruling, order, or interim judgment are patently without legal merit.
Accordingly, both those motions are hereby denied.
.DATED t h i s ^ d a y of / C l l / i ^ T

, 2006.

BY THE COURT

ige Fourth District Court

o >\N «&*
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Exhibi I l> Memorandum Decision and Order Dism issing L ase,
January 4, 2006 (Stewart, J., TTnited States District
Court for the District of Utah)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

TAMARA ROWLEY MULDER,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DISMISSING CASE

vs.

ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER

CaseNo.2:05-CV-919TS

Respondent/Defendant.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Divorce in state court in this matter. Respondent was served
with that Petition on September 13, 2005. Respondent filed a Notice of Removal with this Court
on November 4, 2005. For the reasons discussed below, this Court does not have jurisdiction
over this case and it will be dismissed.
This case must be dismissed for the simple reason that Petitioner is seeking a divorce
decree and this court lacks jurisdiction to issue such a decree.1 Further, Respondent's removal,
even if proper, was untimely. Notice of removal must be filed "within thirty days after the
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting for

x

SeeAnkenbrandtv. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992); Vaughan v. Smithson, 883 F.2d
63, 64 (10th Cir. 1989).
1

the claim for which relief upon which such action or proceeding is based

"2 As noted above,

Respondent was served on September 13, 2005, but his Notice of Removal was not filed until
November 4,2005. As a result, Respondent's Notice of Removal was untimely.
It is therefore
ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.
DATED January 4,2006.
BY THE COURT:

IART
District Judge

2

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

Exhibit 4 ~

Stipulation, December 7, 2005

Stephen T. Hard (USB No. 1359)
725 Chaparral Dr.
Murray, Utah 84123
Tel: 801-918-2800
Fax: 801-327-5565
Email: s.t.hard@att.net

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

/^-o
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH-PROVO DIVISION

TAMARA ROWLEY MULDER
STIPULATION
Petitioner/Plaintiff
vs.

Civil No. 054401811

ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER

Judge: Stott

Respondent/Defendant

Commissioner: Patton

This Stipulation is entered into this 7* day of December by and between the Plaintiff,
Tamara Rowley Mulder and the Defendant Robert Matthew Mulder in connection with
the above-referenced matter and the matter of Mulder v. Mulder, Civil No. 054402186
filed in this same court.
1. The Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions")
submitted to the Hon. Gary D. Stott after the hearing on the Plaintiffs Motion for
Entry of Default Divorce Decree shall be entered immediately, without protest or
delay, and shall not be disputed by the Defendant, nor shall the Defendant file any
motion to set aside the Findings and Conclusions or the Decree of Divorce.

2. Except as set forth herein, the terms of the Decree of Divorce shall be entered and
shall not be challenged by the Defendant.
3. The Plaintiff shall allow the Ex Parte Protective Order in Civil No. 054402186 to
expire and shall not seek a renewal thereof except in the event of any new
incidents justifying application for a new protective order.
4. The Defendant, any wife (legal or common law) and any associate of the
Defendant shall maintain a distance of at least 100 feet from the Plaintiff except in
connection with scheduled visitations and court appearances.
5. The Defendant, any wife (legal or common law), and any associate of the
Defendant shall maintain a distance of at least 100 feet from any residence of the
Plaintiff; the real property of any of Plaintiff s parents, brothers or sisters; the
Plaintiffs place or places of employment; and the children's schools, except in
connection with scheduled visitation.
6. Any initial violation of paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be considered contempt of court.
Any subsequent violations of paragraph 4 and 5 shall be subject to the same
criminal penalties as though an Ex Parte Protective Order had been violated.
7. From the date hereof, through December, 2006; the following provisions shall
apply to visitations by the Defendant with the parties' minor children:
a. All visits with the parties' minor children shall occur at the same time.
b. The Defendant's father or mother shall be present at all pickups and drop
offs of the minor children and any visitations in Utah.
c. The Defendant can arrange for visitation with the minor children
commencing in January 2006 for a continuous period of one week

2

provided that the children do not miss more than two days of school for
such visitation.
d. The Defendant's extended visitation with the minor children shall occur in
California at the Defendant's father's house.
e. The costs of transportation of the minor children shall be borne by
Defendant. Any flights to and from the Defendant's father's house shall be
direct flights until the youngest minor child reaches the age of 13.
f.

Any summer visitations may be for a period of four consecutive weeks.
Defendant shall give 45 days advance notice of the requested period of
summer visitation. For all other visitations, Defendant shall give at least
30 days advance notice. For all visitations, Defendant shall confirm travel
arrangements at least 15 days in advance of travel.

g. Except as provided above, the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§30-3-33,
-35, and -36 shall apply to visitations.
h. The parties agree to refrain from the use of drugs or alcohol prior to or
while the children are in their custody or during visitation.
8. Provided that the Defendant's visitations with the minor children goes without
adverse incident, the visitation provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§30-3-33,-35, and
-36 shall apply to all subsequent visitations commencing January 1, 2007.
9. Outside of visitations set forth above, Plaintiff has established or will establish a
separate email address to and from which the Defendant may correspond with the
minor children. In addition, visitation arrangements shall be made by the Plaintiff
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and Defendant through this email address. Weekly telephone calls shall be
arranged at a designated time.
10. The Defendant will withdraw any subpoena that he may have caused to be issued
in this case and shall provide notice of the same to Plaintiffs counsel.
11. Unless the court orders otherwise at a specific date, the parties waive the
requirement of mandatory parent classes.
12. In the event that Plaintiff elects to establish residency outside Utah, she will
comply with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-37(1) regarding notification
of intent to move out-of-state.
13. The parties will notice a scheduling conference after February 1, 2006 to set forth
the resolution of any other issues remaining between the parties.
14. The terms of this Stipulation may only be modified for cause, unless agreed to in
writing by both parties.
15. The Parties agree that an Order consistent with this Stipulation shall be entered by
the Court.
DATED this

day of December, 2005.
JACKSON, WALTER, EVANS
& HUNTSMAN

r

Counsel for Plaintiff

nstianSSn
Counselor Defendant

AGREED AND ACCEPTED:

AGREED AND ACCEPTED:

Tamara Rowley Muld£

'obert Matthew Mulder

4

Exhibit 5 — Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law,
December 7, 2005.

Stephen T. Hard (USB No. 1359)
725 Chaparral Dr.
Murray, Utah 84123
Tel: 801-918-2800
Fax: 801-327-5565
Email: s.t.hard@att.net

FILED
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH-PROVO DIVISION

TAMARA ROWLEY MULDER

FINDINGS
OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner/Plaintiff
vs.

Civil No. 054401811

ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER

Judge: Stott

Respondent/Defendant

Commissioner: Patton

This action came on for consideration and hearing on Petitioner's Motion for
Entry of a Default Divorce on December 1,2005. Petitioner was present and represented
by her counsel. Respondent/Defendant was not present despite having been advised the
prior week that this hearing was going forward. Mr. Gregory J. Christiansen entered an
appearance on behalf of the Respondent/Defendant. Based upon the review of the file and
the information presented, the Court hereby adopts the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
A. FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE.
1. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is a bona fide and actual resident of Utah
County, State of Utah and had been a legal resident for a period in excess of three
(3) months prior to the commencement of the above-entitled action.
2. The Court finds that the Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband,
respectively, having been married on September 29,1984.
3. The Court finds that the parties have irreconcilable differences. The Court
understands that so long as the terms set forth herein are not challenged, that
Plaintiff waives any claim for alimony, alimony based on "cause" and seeks no
marital property other than the personal property she and the parties' children
currently possess.
4. The Court finds that the parties have six (6) children born of their issue: Richard
born M y 9, 1985; Nathan born November 11,1986; David born May 7, 1988;
Peter born January 1,1993; Theodore born October 23, 1996; and Charity bom
August 2,1999.
5. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded the sole physical and legal
custody of the parties' minor children and that the Defendant should be awarded
reasonable rights of visitation after an evaluation and further hearing to determine
the conditions of such visitation.
6. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not been employed outside of the parties'
residence for a substantial period of time and that Defendant is a computer
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programmer who was making at least $5,000 per month during his last full time
employment. Accordingly, the Court will impute income to the Defendant of
$5,000 per month and the Plaintiff $0 per month for the calculation of child
support under the Uniform Child Support guidelines. The Court finds that
payment of this child support in the amount of $1,450 per month should
commence December 5, 2005. This calculation of child support may be reconsidered after one year from the date of these Findings.
7. The Court finds that it is fair, just and equitable that each of the parties should be
ordered to assume, pay, discharge and hold the other party harmless from any
existing debts or obligations incurred separately by them since the
commencement of the above-entitled action; and that they should each be
required to so inform their respective creditors. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
Plaintiff shall have no responsibility for payments to Defendant's brother for any
time during which the Plaintiff lived on the Defendant's brother's property in
California. The allocation of pre-petition debts, if any, shall be subject of further
hearings subject to all legal and equitable considerations.
8. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to immediately begin using her
maiden name of Tamara Lynn Rowley.
9. All statutory waiting periods are waived as there is no chance for reconciliation.
10. Any claims for Defendant to pay Plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs
are reserved for further proceedings.
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B. FINDINGS OF FACT RELATED TO THE ENTRY OF A DEFAULT DECREE OF
DIVORCE AND THE EFFECT OF FILINGS RELATED TO THE PEMBINA
NATION LITTE SHELL BAND OF NORTH AMERICA.
11. That Plaintiff filed this action on September 7, 2005.
12. That Defendant was personally served with a copy of the Summons and
Complaint in this action on September 13,2005.
13. That Defendant filed a Notice of Removal and Automatic Stay, purportedly based
upon the Defendant's membership in the "Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of
North America."
14. That Defendant failed to timely file any answer, motion to dismiss, or other
pleading required by Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
15. That the "Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America'5 (hereinafter
referred to as "Pembina") is not a federally-recognized tribe. Accordingly, no
orders or decrees of this organization have any validity, weight or bearing in any
legal proceeding before this court.
16. That the Plaintiff is not of Indian heritage and is not a lineal descendant of any
Native American.
17. That Pembina has no personal or subject matter jurisdiction over her.
18. That the Defendant contends that he has been named as a "Tribal Judge" by
Pembina and that in his capacity as "Tribal Judge" he has issued a Divorce Decree
dissolving his marriage to Plaintiff. Although this document has no legal effect
whatsoever, it indicates the acceptance or acquiescence of a order dissolving the

marriage by this Court. Further, Defendant's counsel represented that Defendant
does not oppose the dissolution of the marriage.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That the Court has in personam and subject matter jurisdiction.
2. That the default of the Defendant should be entered herein and the Plaintiff
awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences subject to further order or findings of dissolution for cause.
3. That to the extent the foregoing Findings of Fact are Conclusions of Law, the
same are incorporated herein by reference and made a part hereof.
4. That the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America is not a federallyrecognized tribe and there is no statute or treaty requiring recognition of any
documents from that organization. Accordingly, the "Notice of Removal and
Automatic Stay," the "Divorce Decree" and other documents filed claiming
authority from the "Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America" are a
legal nullity with no force or effect upon the Plaintiff or this Court.

DATED this _ 2 - daY ofiJ^^^i'^

; 2005.
BY THE COURT

-o

Exhibit 6 —

Divorce Decree, December 7, 2005

Stephen T. Hard (USB No. 1359)
725 Chaparral Dr.
Murray, Utah 84123
Tel: 801-918-2800
Fax: 801-327-5565
Email: s.t.hard@att.net
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH-PROVO DIVISION

TAMARA ROWLEY MULDER

DECREE
OF
DIVORCE

Petitioner/Plaintiff
vs.

Civil No. 054401811

ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER

Judge: Stott

Respondent/Defendant

Commissioner: Parton

The Defendant was served with the Summons and Petition on September 13,
2005, but has failed to file an Answer or other pleading authorized by Rule 12 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure within twenty (20) days of service. Based upon the Motion for
Entry of Default Divorce Decree, the Affidavit of Tamara Rowley Mulder, and the
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Default Divorce Decree and for good
cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. That the Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant on
the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The issue of whether cause existed with
respect to the issue of alimony is reserved for further hearing in the event this
Decree is challenged.

2. That Petitioner and the Defendant have six children. Petitioner shall be and she is
hereby awarded the sole legal and physical custody of the parties5 four minor
children subject to visitation rights which shall be determined after evaluaiotn of
the Defendant and further hearing.. The parties' minor children are: David
Michael whose birth date is May 7, 1988 and who has been diagnosed with
Crohns Disease requiring ongoing therapy and treatment; Peter Steven-Gilbert,
whose birth date is January 11,1993 and who suffers from Tourette Syndrome
requiring ongoing therapy and treatment; Theodore William, whose birth date is
October 23, 1996; and Charity Lynn, whose birthdate is August 2, 1999.
3. That the Defendant has imputed income of $5,000 per month and the Plaintiff $0
per month. Accordingly, the Defendant is ordered to pay child support of $1,450
per month, with each payment to be made by the fifth day of each month
commencing December 5, 2005.
4. That the Petitioner is hereby authorized to resume the use of her maiden name:
Tamara Lynn Rowley.
5. That the Petitioner is awarded all of her and the parties' children's personal
property presently in their possession. So long as this Decree is unchallenged, the
Defendant shall receive all other marital property. Allocation of the parties'
liabilities is reserved for further proceedings.
6. That each of the parties is hereby ordered to assume^ pay, discharge, and hold the
other harmless from any existing debts or obligations or any future debts or
obligations incurred separately by them since August 21, 2005.
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7. That a scheduling conference shall be held to set forth the dates for completion of
discovery necessary for the determination of outstanding issues.
DATED this

/

day of 1. \ujL*dt&^—

2005.
BY THE COURT:
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Exhibit 7 ~ Order and Addendum to Divorce Decree,
December 7, 2005.

Stephen T. Hard (USB No. 1359)
725 Chaparral Dr.
Murray, Utah 84123
Tel: 801-918-2800
Fax: 801-327-5565
Email: s.t.hard@att.net
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH-PROVO DIVISION

TAMARA ROWLEY MULDER
ORDER AND ADDENDUM
TO DIVORCE DECREE
Petitioner/Plaintiff
vs.

Civil No. 054401811

ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER

Judge: Stott

Respondent/Defendant

Commissioner: Patton

This Order and Addendum to Divorce Decree is effective as of this 7th day of
December based upon the Stipulation filed herewith reached between the Plaintiff,
Tamara Rowley Mulder and the Defendant Robert Matthew Mulder in connection with
the above-referenced matter and the matter of Mulder v. Mulder, Civil No. 054402186
filed in this same court, which Stipulation the Court finds just and reasonable.
1. The Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions55)
submitted to this Court after the hearing on the Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of
Default Divorce Decree is hereby entered, effective immediately, without protest
or delay, and shall not be disputed by the Defendant, nor shall the Defendant file
any motion to set aside the Findings and Conclusions or the Decree of Divorce.

2. Except as set forth herein, the terms of the Decree of Divorce shall be entered and
shall not be challenged by the Defendant.
3. The Plaintiff shall allow the Ex Parte Protective Order in Civil No. 054402186 to
expire and shall not seek a renewal thereof except in the event of any new
incidents justifying application for a new protective order.
4. The Defendant, any wife (legal or common law) and any associate of the
Defendant shall maintain a distance of at least 10*0 feet from the Plaintiff except in
connection with scheduled visitations and court appearances.
5. The Defendant, any wife (legal or common law), and any associate of the
Defendant shall maintain a distance of at least 100 feet from any residence of the
Plaintiff; the real property of any of Plaintiffs parents, brothers or sisters; the
Plaintiffs place or places of employment; and the children's schools, except in
connection with scheduled visitation.
6. Any initial violation of paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be considered contempt of court.
Any subsequent violations of paragraph 4 and 5 shall be subject to the same
criminal penalties as though an Ex Parte Protective Order had been violated.
7. From the date hereof, through December, 2006; the following provisions shall
apply to visitations by the Defendant with the parties' minor children:
a. All visits with the parties' minor children shall occur at the same time.
b. The Defendant's father or mother shall be present at all pickups and drop
offs of the minor children and at any visitations in Utah.
c. The Defendant can arrange for visitation with the minor children
commencing in January 2006 for a continuous period of one week
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provided that the children do not miss more than two days of school for
such visitation.
d. The Defendant's extended visitation with the minor children shall occur in
California at the Defendant's father's house.
e. The costs of transportation of the minor children shall be borne by
Defendant. Any flights to and from the Defendant's father's house shall be
direct flights until the youngest minor child reaches the age of 13.
f.

Any summer visitations may be for a period of four consecutive weeks.
Defendant shall give 45 days advance notice of the requested period of
summer visitation. For all other visitations, Defendant shall give at least
30 days advance notice. For all visitations, Defendant shall confirm travel
arrangements at least 15 days in advance of travel.

g. Except as provided above, the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§30-3-33,
-35, and -36 shall apply to visitations.
h. The parties agree to refrain from the use of drugs or alcohol prior to or
while the children are in their custody or during visitation,
8. Provided that the Defendant's visitations with the minor children goes without
adverse incident, the visitation provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-33, -35,
and -36 shall apply to all subsequent visitations commencing January 1, 2007.
9. Outside of visitations set forth above, Plaintiff has established or will establish a
separate email address to and from which the Defendant may correspond with the
minor children. In addition, visitation arrangements shall be made by the Plaintiff
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and Defendant through this email address. Weekly telephone calls shall be
arranged at a designated time.
10 The Defendant will withdraw any subpoena that he may have caused to be issued
in this case and shall provide notice of the same to Plaintiffs counsel.
11. Unless the court orders otherwise at a specific date, the parties waive the
requirement of mandatory parent classes.
12 In the event that Plaintiff elects to establish residency outside Utah, she will
comply with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-37(1) regarding notification
of intent to move out-of-state.
13. The parties will notice a scheduling conference after February 1, 2006 to set forth
the resolution of any other issues remaining between the parties.
14. The terms of this Stipulation may only be modified for cause, unless agreed to in
writing by both parties.
DATED this

(

day of December, 2005.
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Exhibit 8 -- Order to Show Cause Why Defendant Should Not Be
Held in Contempt of Court for Failing to Comply
with the Orders of this Court, November 8, 2006.

Stephen T. Hard (USB No. 1359)
725 Chaparral Dr.
Murray, Utah 84123
Tel: 801-918-2800
Fax: 801-327-5565
Email: s.t.hard@att.net
Counsel for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH-PROVO DIVISION

TAMARA ROWLEY MULDER
Petitioner/Plaintiff
vs.
ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
WHY DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT
BE HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR
: FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
THE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
:
Civil No. 054401811

Respondent/Defendant

:

Judge: Stott
Commissioner: Patton

Based upon the Ex Parte Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendant Should
Not Be Held in Contempt for Failing to Comply with the Orders of this Court, and for
good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Defendant shall appear for a hearing before this Court or the Commissioner
to be held at 9{]0 £,m. on tfy?CJ.ftlfoA

I , 2006.

2. At said hearing, the Defendant may retain counsel or continue to represent
himself, and he shall present evidence and argument as to:

a. Why he should not be held in contempt for failing to pay child support
when and as ordered by the Court.
b. Why he should not be held in contempt for violating this Court's
October 2, 2006 Order by filing motions which continue to raise
jurisdictional challenges to the Court which have been previously ruled
upon and denied by this Court.
c. Why he should not be held in contempt for violating this Court's
October 2, 2006 Order by filing motions which continue to raise
Constitutional and due process challenges to the Court which have been
previously ruled upon and denied by the Court.
d. Why he should not be ordered to pay Plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees
and expenses.
e. Why he should not be fined for willful violations of the Court's prior
orders.
f.

Why he should not be jailed for violation of the Court's prior orders.when
the Defendant knew what was required of him, when he had the ability to
comply with those orders, and when he willfully chose to violate those
orders.

DATED this $_ day of November, 2006.
BY THE COURT*
A
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Exhibit 9 ~

Notice of Appeal, December 1, 2006.

Robert Mulder
c/o P.O. Box 1098
Clearlake Oaks, California [95423]
Alleged Defendant, in Propria Persona
By Special Appearance

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH-PROVO DIVISION

TAMARA ROWLEY MULDER
Petitioner/Plaintiff in Error
Notice of Appeal
vs.
ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER[SIC]

Civil No.: 054401811

Respondent/Defendant in Error

Judge: Stott

By Special Appearance

Notice is hereby given that Robert Matthew Mulder, unrepresented defendant in
error in the above named case, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals from all
Orders entered on December 1, 2006 in this action, on the grounds of this court's
failure to provide due process of law, and the attempts of this court to enforce a
contract that is void for fraud and lack of full disclosure.

Dated the 1st day of December, 2006.

Respectfully submitted,
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice,

obert Matthew Mulder, in Propria Persona

Certificate of Service

I certify that on the 1st day of December, 2006, I

mailed/

hand

delivered a copy of my Notice of Appeal to the petitioner's counsel whose mailing
address is:
Stephen T. Hard
725 Chaparral Dr.
Murray, Utah 84123

Exhibit 10 - Minutes Motion/Contempt Hearing, January 8, 2007

4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TAMARA ROWLEY MULDER,
Petitioner,

MINUTES
MOTION/CONTEMPT HEARING

vs .

Case No: 054401811 DA

ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER,
Respondent

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

GARY D STOTT
January 8, 2007

marilynn

PRESENT
Petitioner's Attorney: STEPHEN T HARD
Audio
Tape Number:
07-04 403
Tape Count: 2:19-2:24

HEARING
This matter comes before the Court for a Motion/Contempt Hearing.
Stephen Hard is present as counsel for the petitioner. The
respondent, Robert Mulder, fails to appear.
Mr Hard reviews the status of the case for the Court.
The Court informs Mr Hard that Mr Mulder has filed a Summons and
Counterclaim for Trespass and Trespass on the Case, copies of which
have been forwarded to Brent Johnson, counsel for the
Administrative Office of the
Courts. There will be no further action on this case until the
appeal process is resolved. Due to Mr Mulder's recent filing, the
case has been reassigned to Division 7, the Honorable James R
Taylor.
Mr Hard responds. A formal notice of reassignment will be mailed
to the parties.
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Exhibit 11—

Recusal Order, January 10, 2007
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Fourth Judicial District Coin
of Utah County State ot Utah
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
Oi<VA<<^^
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY
^ Dsnur

TAMARA ROWLEY MULDER,
Petitioner,

RECUSAL ORDER
vs.

Case No. 054401811 DA

ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER,
Respondent.

RECUSAL - CASE REASSIGNED
The Honorable Gary D Stott has recused himself from further involvement in the
above-captioned case due to a conflict. Under the regular assignment of cases, these matters
are reassigned to the Honorable James R Taylor for further proceedings.

DATED- January 10, 2007

»v.
GARY D STOTT
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached aocument was sent to the
following people for case 054401811 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD

NAME

Mail

ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER
RESPONDENT
PO BOX 1098
CLEARLAKE OAKS, CA 95423
STEPHEN T HARD
ATTORNEY PET
725 W CHAPARRAL DR
MURRAY UT 84123

Mail

Dated this

/Q

day of

(

f-

.> 2 0/g?

•

•VUOU,

Deputy CourwjS^rlK
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